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INTRODUCTION 
More than ten years ago in Cameroon, Elizabeth became a widow.1  
Elizabeth’s in-laws accused her of killing her husband for his proper-
ty, and took away everything she owned.2  Her in-laws shaved her 
head with a broken bottle, although scissors are customary.3  She was 
not allowed to see her children, bathe, or wear clothes for two 
months.4  Her husband’s family forced her to sleep on the ground.5  
After two months, she escaped with her children to her sister’s home.6  
A month later, her in-laws found her and demanded that she either 
pay the bride price or marry her husband’s older brother, who already 
had two wives.7  When she told them that she would not marry her 
husband’s brother and that she could not pay the bride price, her in-
laws beat her.8  The in-laws threatened that if she did not comply with 
their demands within one month, they would kill her and take her 
children.9  Fortunately, Elizabeth and her children were able to leave 
Cameroon and come to the United States.10 
 
 1. See Ngengwe v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1029, 1031 (8th Cir. 2008). 
 2. See id. at 1030–32; T.S. Twibell, The Development of Gender as a Basis for 
Asylum in United States Immigration Law and Under the United Nations Refugee 
Convention: Case Studies of Female Asylum Seekers From Cameroon, Eritrea, Iraq 
and Somalia, 24 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 189, 213 (2010) (providing a more detailed version 
of the facts of Elizabeth Ngengwe’s case than is presented in the Eighth Circuit case). 
 3. See Ngengwe, 543 F.3d at 1031; Twibell, supra note 2, at 214. 
 4. See Ngengwe, 543 F.3d at 1031; Twibell, supra note 2, at 214. 
 5. See Ngengwe, 543 F.3d at 1031. 
 6. See id. at 1032. 
 7. See id. 
 8. See id. 
 9. See id. 
 10. See id. 
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More than eight years after requesting asylum, Elizabeth was 
granted asylum in the United States.11  To be eligible for asylum, an 
asylum seeker must establish that she experienced persecution or fear 
of persecution on account of one of five enumerated grounds, includ-
ing membership in a “particular social group” (“PSG”).12  When Eliz-
abeth’s case came before the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit, the court held that Cameroonian widows constitute a 
PSG, and that the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) and Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals (“BIA”) erred in holding otherwise in her earlier asy-
lum proceedings.13  One year after the Eighth Circuit’s decision, the 
BIA found Elizabeth eligible for asylum.14  After more than eight 
years, Elizabeth found refuge in the United States.15 
Elizabeth’s case highlights how the confusion about which groups 
constitute PSGs can seriously delay meritorious asylum applications.16  
Here, the immigration courts’ erroneous rulings invalidating Eliza-
beth’s PSG of female Cameroonian widows stood as a barrier to her 
asylum claim.17  Just before Elizabeth was granted asylum, the attor-
ney who represented her explained that “Elizabeth’s case is ap-
proaching almost nine years in the asylum process, and one of the 
highest courts of the United States has found serious errors with the 
decision of both the Immigration Judge and the BIA.”18  Based on the 
duration of Elizabeth’s case, the attorney concluded that “[t]he op-
pression that Elizabeth has experienced in Cameroon has continued 
in the U.S. through the asylum process.”19 
Thousands of refugees like Elizabeth seek asylum in the United 
States every year.20  In 2010, the United States received more than 
 
 11. See id. (noting that Elizabeth submitted her asylum application in 2001). 
 12. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 1101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42) 
(West 2006). 
 13. See Ngengwe, 543 F.3d at 1034. 
 14. See Elizabeth Ngengwe, WORLD ORGANIZATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS USA, 
http://www.humanrightsusa.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=203
&Itemid=158 (last visited Jan. 20, 2012) (noting that after Human Rights USA filed 
an amicus brief, the BIA found Elizabeth Ngengwe eligible for asylum in December 
2009). 
 15. See id. 
 16. See Ngengwe, 534 F.3d at 1034. 
 17. See id.  
 18. Twibell, supra note 2, at 229. 
 19. Id. 
 20. See EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, OFFICE OF PLANNING, ANALY-
SIS, AND TECH., FY 2010 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK I1 (2011), available at http://www. 
justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fy10syb.pdf (noting that the United States received 32,961 
asylum applications in 2010 and granted asylum to 9,869 cases). 
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32,000 asylum applications,21 the second-highest number of applica-
tions in the world.22  The large number of refugees that seek asylum 
in the United States every year indicates the importance of U.S. asy-
lum law and its substantial effect on the world refugee population.23 
A refugee seeking asylum in the United States must establish the 
eligibility of her asylum claim.24  To be eligible for asylum in the 
United States, an applicant has to establish “persecution or a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”25  The 
statute governing asylum law, the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(“INA”), does not define the phrase “particular social group.”26  
Asylees whose claims do not fit within the categories of race, religion, 
nationality, or political opinion often try to fit their claims within the 
undefined category of PSG.27  As a result, a court’s interpretation of 
PSG can determine the outcome of a case.28  In fact, among the five 
 
 21. See id. 
 22. U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, 2009 GLOBAL TRENDS, REFUGEES, ASY-
LUM-SEEKERS, RETURNEES, INTERNALLY DISPLACED AND STATELESS PERSONS 1 
(2010), available at http://www.unhcr.org/4c11f0be9.html (noting that South Africa 
received more asylum applications than any other country in the world, and that the 
United States received the second largest number of asylum applications in the world 
in 2009). 
 23. See EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, OFFICE OF PLANNING, ANALY-
SIS, AND TECH., FY 2009 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK (2010), available at http:// 
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fy09syb.pdf. 
 24. See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42) (West 2006). 
 25. Id. 
 26. See Poroj-Mejia v. Holder, 397 F. App’x 234, 237 (7th Cir. 2010) (stating that 
the INA does not define PSG); In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 232 (B.I.A. 1985) 
(noting that “Congress did not indicate what it understood [‘PSG’] to mean”), over-
ruled on other grounds by In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987); Victo-
ria Neilson, Symposium, Globalization, Security & Human Rights: Immigration in 
the Twenty-First Century: Homosexual or Female? Applying Gender-Based Asylum 
Jurisprudence to Lesbian Asylum Claims, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 417, 421 (2005). 
 27. See Poroj-Mejia, 397 F. App’x at 236; In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 232; 
Neilson, supra note 26, at 420 (noting that the INA does not define PSG, making it a 
desirable category for leftover claims which do not fit within race, religion, nationali-
ty or political opinion). 
 28. See, e.g., In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 961 (B.I.A. 2006), aff’d sub nom. 
Castillo-Arias v. Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 1190 (11th Cir. 2006) (dismissing the appeal for 
the asylum case based on the holding that noncriminal drug informants of the Cali 
drug cartel do not constitute a PSG); In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365-68 
(B.I.A. 1996) (holding that young women in a Togolese tribe, who have not had fe-
male genital mutilation (“FGM”) and who oppose the practice, constitute a PSG); In 
re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 234-36 (denying eligibility for asylum based, among oth-
er factors, on the holding that Salvadoran taxi drivers do not constitute a PSG). 
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grounds for asylum, PSG is the second most frequently used.29  Addi-
tionally, the definition of PSG is the most debated ground for asy-
lum.30  For these reasons,31 the definition of this term merits analysis. 
The debate about asylum law and the definition of PSG is partly in-
formed by policy.32  Commentators advocating for a more inclusive 
definition of PSG assert that asylum law should comport with the 
humanitarian purpose of international refugee law.33  On the other 
side of the debate, commentators in favor of restricting the definition 
of PSG make arguments based on the risk of tipping the balance 
struck by multilateral treaties, the risk of making the other enumerat-
 
 29. See ANNA MARIE GALLAGHER & SHANE DIZON, 2 IMMIGR. LAW SERV. § 
10:138 (2d ed. West 2010). 
 30. See James C. Hathaway & Michelle Foster, Membership of a Particular Social 
Group, 15 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 477 (2003); see also Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1238 
(3d Cir. 1993) (Alito, J.) (citations omitted) (noting that “[b]oth courts and commen-
tators have struggled to define ‘particular social group’”); Summary Conclusions: 
Membership of a Particular Social Group, Expert Roundtable, San Remo, September 
2001, in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNHCR’S GLOBAL CON-
SULTATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 312 (Erika Feller, Volker Turk & 
Frances Nicholson eds., 2003) [hereinafter UNHCR’S GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS] 
(noting that “membership in a particular social group is the Convention ground with 
the least clarity”). 
 31. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text. 
 32. In this policy debate, the yardstick problem of how to measure whether asy-
lum law admits too many or too few refugees arises.  The yardstick problem is best 
resolved by Congress as a policy matter and is outside the scope of this Note.  This 
Note does, however, respond to the argument that adopting the Third and Seventh 
Circuits’ approach will open the floodgates for refugees. See infra notes 35–38 and 
accompanying text; infra notes 357-362 and accompanying text.  The yardstick prob-
lem centers on the question of whether asylum law admits the correct number of ref-
ugees.  In contrast, the floodgates argument criticizes various asylum approaches and 
decisions based on fears of a dramatic increase of refugees in the United States.  This 
Note only tackles the floodgates argument to the extent of defending the Third and 
Seventh Circuits’ approach against it, without commenting specifically on whether 
the overall number of persons granted asylum in the United States is too high or too 
low. 
 33. See Leonard Birdsong, Symposium, Immigration: To Admit or Deny?: “Give 
Me Your Gays, Your Lesbians, and Your Victims of Gender Violence, Yearning To 
Breathe Free of Sexual Persecution . . .”: The New Grounds for Grants of Asylum, 32 
NOVA L. REV. 357, 360 (2008) (asserting that asylum law and human rights law are 
closely interrelated) (citations omitted); Arlene Kanter & Kristin Dadey, The Right 
to Asylum for People with Disabilities, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 1117, 1118, 1120 (2000) (as-
serting that after World War II, the United States and other countries “sought to ful-
fill their humanitarian obligations to refugees” in the development of asylum law); 
Kristen Walker, Defending the 1951 Convention Definition of Refugee, 17 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 583, 585 (2003) (citing James Hathaway, A Reconsideration of the Un-
derlying Premise of Refugee Law, 31 HARV. INT’L L.J. 129, 173 (1990)) (rebutting 
Hathaway’s argument that the 1951 Convention is about the triumph of state interest 
and arguing that the 1951 Convention has a humanitarian purpose). 
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ed categories redundant, and the dangers of using PSG as a “safety 
net.”34 
The most prominent argument in favor of restricting the definition 
of PSG is based on concerns about opening the floodgates.35  Advo-
cates of restricting asylum law argue that if the definition of PSG is 
too broad, the United States will “open the floodgates” of refugees.36  
Other commentators contend that floodgate concerns are unwarrant-
ed.37  These commentators base their contention on three factors: the 
negligible effect of past expansions in U.S. asylum law, how flood-
gates fears did not materialize in other nations, and the hurdles asy-
lum applicants must overcome to obtain asylum.38 
The policy debate about U.S. asylum law can be boiled down to ar-
guments about whether asylum laws are too inclusive or too restric-
tive.39  This Note advocates the position that adjudication concerning 
PSG should be uniform across jurisdictions to avoid inconsistency and 
 
 34. See JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 158-61 (1991) 
[hereinafter HATHAWAY, REFUGEE STATUS]; T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Protected 
Characteristics and Social Perceptions: An Analysis of the Meaning of “Membership 
in a Particular Social Group,” in UNHCR’S GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS, supra note 30, 
at 285. 
 35. See MICHELLE FOSTER, INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW AND SOCIO-
ECONOMIC RIGHTS: REFUGE FROM DEPRIVATION 344 (2007) (observing that there is 
“a ‘Bresnahan’ concern . . . either explicitly or implicitly underpinning decision-
makers’ caution” in claims based on socio-economic deprivation and other bases); 
KEVIN R. JOHNSON, OPENING THE FLOODGATES: WHY AMERICA NEEDS TO RETHINK 
ITS BORDERS AND IMMIGRATION LAWS 27 (2007) (stating that “the deep-seated fear 
persists that, absent strict migration controls, the United States risks being over-
whelmed by hordes of immigrants of different races, cultures, and creeds who will 
‘take over’ the country . . . . Thus, any debate about immigration—from relatively 
minor efforts to more aggressive ones—must invariably confront the floodgates con-
cern.”). 
 36. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 37. See, e.g., Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo & Claudia David, Pulling the Trigger: 
Separation Violence as a Basis for Refugee Protection for Battered Women, 59 AM. 
U. L. REV. 337, 380-81 (2009); Aubra Fletcher, Note, The REAL ID Act: Furthering 
Gender Bias in U.S. Asylum Law, 21 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 111, 129 
(2006); Sarah Siddiqui, Note, Membership in a Particular Social Group: All Ap-
proaches Open Doors for Women to Qualify, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 505, 527-28 (2010). 
 38. See, e.g., Cianciarulo & David, supra note 37, at 380-81 (citing In re Kasinga, 
21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 366 (B.I.A. 1996)) (discussing how the BIA’s recognition of a so-
cial group based on female genital mutilation in Kasinga faced similar floodgate fears 
which never materialized and explaining how asylees have other obstacles to surpass 
after establishing membership in a social group); see Fletcher, supra note 37, at 129 
(explaining the favorable experience of Canada); Siddiqui, supra note 37, at 527-28 
(describing how the addition of gender as a basis for asylum had a negligible effect on 
asylum applications and other elements that asylees need to prove). 
 39. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text. 
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arbitrariness.40  There are significant differences among the circuit 
courts’ approaches to defining PSG.41  These differences come from 
the circuit courts’ use of different legal tests to define PSG.42  The dif-
ferent approaches to defining PSG have led to a circuit split between 
the Ninth Circuit, the Third and Seventh Circuits, and the circuit 
courts that follow the BIA.43  Specifically, in Gatimi v. Holder, the 
Seventh Circuit rejected the approach used by the BIA to define 
PSG, thus moving away from the definition of PSG used by the ma-
jority of circuit courts.44  Two years later, the Third Circuit followed 
suit, also rejecting the BIA’s approach.45   This Note will refer to the 
Third and Seventh Circuits as the “dissenting circuits.”46  
This Note analyzes the definition of PSG in asylum law.  Specifical-
ly, it examines the various tests that different circuit courts use to de-
fine PSG.  Rather than focus on a specific affected group,47 this Note 
 
 40. See Lindsay M. Harris & Morgan M. Weibel, Matter of S-E-G-: The Final 
Nail in the Coffin for Gang-Related Asylum Claims?, 20 LA RAZA L.J. 5, 25 (2010); 
Michael G. Heyman, Protecting Foreign Victims of Domestic Violence: An Analysis 
of Asylum Regulations, 12 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 115, 120 (2008) [hereinaf-
ter Heyman, Protecting Foreign Victims]; Michele A. Voss, Note, Young and 
Marked for Death: Expanding the Definition of “Particular Social Group” in Asylum 
Law to Include Youth Victims of Gang Persecution, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 235, 252-53 
(2005); see also JAYA RAMI-NOGALES ET AL., REFUGEE ROULETTE: DISPARITIES IN 
ASYLUM ADJUDICATION AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 79 (2009) [hereinafter, RAMI-
NOGALES, PROPOSALS FOR REFORM]; Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz & 
Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. 
REV. 295, 299 (2007). 
 41. See, e.g., Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2010); Gatimi v. Holder, 
578 F.3d 611 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 42. See infra Part II. 
 43. See infra Part II (describing the conflict between the Ninth Circuit, the Third 
and Seventh Circuits, and the courts that follow the BIA, which include the First, Se-
cond, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits); see also infra notes 
314 and accompanying text (noting that the Fifth Circuit has not taken a definitive 
position on the issue); see also Bayavarpu v. Holder, 390 F. App’x 353 (5th Cir. 2010); 
Orellana-Monson v. Holder, 332 F. App’x 202, 203 (5th Cir. 2009); Nkwonta v. 
Mukasey, 295 F. App’x 279, 285-86 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 44. See 578 F.3d at 615 (rejecting the BIA’s social visibility test). 
 45. See Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen., No. 08-4564, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 
22565, at *67 (3d Cir. Nov. 8, 2011).  
 46. Although the Ninth Circuit’s approach also differs from the approach of the 
majority of the circuits that follow the BIA, the designation of “dissenting circuits” 
for the approach of only the Third and Seventh Circuits is merely for purposes of 
clarity and does not imply that the Ninth Circuit agrees with the circuits that follow 
the BIA. 
 47. See, e.g., Cianciarulo & David, supra note 37 (proposing that battered women 
from severely abusive relationships should be recognized as a social group); Tessa 
Davis, Note, Lost in Doctrine: Particular Social Group, Child Soldiers, and the Fail-
ure of U.S. Asylum Law to Protect Exploited Children, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 653, 
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looks at the definition of PSG in general, emphasizing strengths and 
weaknesses of the different approaches currently practiced in the 
United States.  This point of view allows for a resolution to the con-
flict among the circuits that is not dependent on the fate of a specific 
group.  Part I explains the domestic and international legal frame-
work of PSG in U.S. asylum law.  Part II analyzes the different tests 
that the circuit courts use to define PSG.  Finally, Part III proposes a 
resolution to the conflicting definitions and argues that the Third and 
Seventh Circuits have formulated the best approach to defining PSG48 
because the approach is easiest to apply, based on coherent statutory 
analysis, and consistent with the United States’ international obliga-
tions.  Given the difficulty of passing immigration legislation creating 
 
677 (2011) (arguing that courts should recognize child soldiers as a PSG); Fatma E. 
Marouf, The Emerging Importance of “Social Visibility” in Defining a “Particular 
Social Group” and Its Potential Impact on Asylum Claims Related to Sexual Orien-
tation and Gender, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 47, 78-102 (2008) (analyzing the effect 
of the definition of social group on claims based on sexual orientation and gender); 
Siddiqui, supra note 37 (arguing that women should be a cognizable social group); 
Voss, supra note 40 (assessing the impact of the definition of social group on former 
gang members). 
 48. For a similar argument in an article focused on a gang-related BIA case and 
the problem of PSG in the context of gang-related asylum claims, see Harris & 
Weibel, supra note 40, at 23 (stating that “[t]he authors are hopeful that the Seventh 
Circuit’s decisions in Gatimi and Benitez Ramos will encourage other circuits to free 
themselves from the confines of the Chevron deference that they have been applying 
to S-E-G-’s social visibility and particularity requirements and return to the original 
Acosta test as Judge Posner [of the Seventh Circuit] and other Circuit Judges, includ-
ing Judge B. Fletcher [of the Ninth Circuit] suggest”); Valdiviezo-Galdamez, 2011 
U.S. App. LEXIS 22565, at *67; Benitez Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426 (7th Cir. 
2009); Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611 (7th Cir. 2009); In re S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 
579 (B.I.A. 2008); In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled on other 
grounds by In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987).  For different solu-
tions to the problems posed by the social visibility test, see Kristin A. Bresnahan, 
Note, The Board of Immigration Appeals’s New “Social Visibility” Test for Deter-
mining “Membership of a Particular Social Group” in Asylum Claims and Its Legal 
and Policy Implications, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 649, 677-78 (2011) (proposing that 
the BIA adopt the approach of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(“UNHCR”)—defining a PSG as a group that satisfies either immutable characteris-
tics or social visibility); Brian Soucek, Comment, Social Group Asylum Claims: A Se-
cond Look at the New Visibility Requirement, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 337, 338-39 
(2010) (arguing that “[p]roperly interpreted, the [social] visibility criterion serves as a 
test of objectivity . . . it prevents applicants from concocting ad hoc social groups in 
their quest for asylum.  What it does not do is demand that individuals be visually 
recognizable as group members in order for courts to recognize their asylum claims,” 
and that the solution should not consist of abandoning the social visibility test, but 
instead, “the government need only reaffirm what should be obvious: Social visibility 
has nothing to do with how groups look”). 
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a uniform definition of PSG,49 this Note proposes that the Supreme 
Court50 should adopt the approach of the dissenting circuits to 
achieve the goals of uniformity and consistency in asylum law. 
I.  ASYLUM LAW 
To set up the circuit split about the meaning of PSG that will be 
discussed in Part II, this Part presents an overview of the domestic 
and international legal framework for PSG in U.S. asylum law.  It first 
discusses the domestic and international legal framework, and then 
goes on to present the cases that have developed the term PSG. 
A. U.S. Asylum Law 
The United States has a robust legal framework that shapes the 
definition of PSG.  The statutory basis for “membership in a particu-
lar social group” as a ground for asylum comes from the Refugee Act 
of 1980, which amended the INA.51  The statute defines a “refugee” 
as: 
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality 
or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any coun-
try in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or 
unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or 
 
 49. See RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, R41704, TI-
TLE 1 (2011), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/key_workplace/810/.  
Bills in the House and Senate propose a clarification of the definition of PSG. See 
Refugee Protection Act of 2011, H.R. 2185, 112th Cong. § 5(a)(D) (2011); Refugee 
Protection Act of 2011, S. 1202, 112th Cong. § 5(a)(D) (2011); see also 157 Cong. 
Rec. H5150-02 (2011); Bill Summary & Status: 112th Congress (2011-2012) H.R. 2185 
THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:h.r.2185: (last visited Sept. 12, 
2011); Bill Summary & Status: 112th Congress (2011-2012) S. 2012, THOMAS, 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:SN01202: (last visited Sept. 12, 2011).  
 50. The Court has never expressly decided the meaning of PSG. See Stanley Dale 
Radtke, Defining a Core Zone of Protection in Asylum Law: Refocusing the Analy-
sis of Membership in a Particular Social Group to Utilize Both the Social Visibility 
and Group Immutability Component Approaches, 10 J.L. & SOC. CHALLENGES 22, 37 
(2008).  The Supreme Court denied certiorari on an unpublished case about the 
meaning of PSG. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *10, Contreras-Martinez v. 
Holder, 346 F. App’x 956 (4th Cir. 2009) (No. 09-830), 2010 WL 128010; see also 
Brief for the Respondent in Opposition at 8, Contreras-Martinez, 346 F. App’x 956 
(No. 09-830), 2010 WL 1513110.  For a discussion of why this unpublished case alleg-
ing a PSG of youths who refuse to join gangs, however, was not a good vehicle for 
resolving the circuit split about the meaning of PSG, see infra notes 301-306 and ac-
companying text. 
 51. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42) (West 2006); H. R. Rep. No. 96-781 (1980) 
(Conf. Rep.) (stating how the Refugee Act of 1980 amends the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act’s definition of refugee). 
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herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a 
well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, na-
tionality, membership in a particular social group, or political opin-
ion.52 
Neither the statute nor its legislative history define PSG.53  Therefore, 
the statute does not determine the meaning of PSG.54 
When ruling on an asylum claim, most courts look at several ele-
ments derived from both statutory and case law.  First, the asylum 
applicant has the burden to show that she meets the definition of ref-
ugee.55  Specifically, she has to show that she has a well-founded fear 
of persecution on account of one of the enumerated categories.56  Se-
cond, persecution must be caused by the government or by someone 
who the government is unwilling or unable to control.57  Third, the 
“nexus” requirement necessitates evidence that the persecution or 
threatened persecution is “on account of” race, religion, nationality, 
political opinion, or membership in a particular social group.58  Final-
ly, “well-founded fear” of persecution has both objective and subjec-
tive components.59 
 
 52. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42) (West 2006). 
 53. See Poroj-Mejia v. Holder, 397 F. App’x 234, 237 (7th Cir. 2010) (stating that 
the INA does not define social group); In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 232; 3-33 
CHARLES GORDON, STANLEY MAILMAN & STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR, IMMIGRATION 
LAW AND PROCEDURE § 33.04 (2010) (citing Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1239 (3d Cir. 
1993)) (discussing the scant legislative history about the definition of social group); 
Radtke, supra note 50, at 28. 
 54. See supra note 53. 
 55. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 208(b)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(b)(i) 
(West 2009). 
 56. See I.N.S. v. Elias Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483 (1992) (holding that an asylum 
applicant, who was allegedly coerced into performing military service by a Guatema-
lan guerilla organization, must show evidence of a “well-founded fear” of persecution 
on account of his political opinion); Sangha v. I.N.S., 103 F.3d 1482, 1486-87 (9th Cir. 
1997) (noting that an asylum applicant must show that he has a well-founded fear of 
persecution on account of his political opinion). 
 57. See, e.g., Pavlova v. I.N.S., 441 F.3d 82, 91-92 (2d Cir. 2006) (reversing BIA 
asylum denial where applicant showed that the Russian government was unwilling to 
control persecution of Baptists driven by religious motives); Fiadjoe v. Att’y Gen., 
411 F.3d 135, 160-63 (3d Cir. 2005) (reversing BIA denial of asylum where country 
report explained that it was futile to report slave practices of Trokosi religious sect 
because the police were unwilling to stop such persecution); Singh v. I.N.S., 94 F.3d 
1353, 1360 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 58. See GORDON, MAILMAN & YALE-LOEHR, supra note 53, at § 33.04 (citing 8 
U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42) (West 2006)). 
 59. See generally GORDON, MAILMAN & YALE-LOEHR, supra note 53, at § 33.04 
(summarizing cases dealing with the subjective and objective components of the 
“well-founded fear” of persecution and their implications for the asylum applicant). 
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Even if an asylum applicant can establish the elements of her claim, 
she may still face several hurdles before her application will be ap-
proved.  For example, an application for asylum will be denied if the 
applicant has participated in the persecution of others, has a prior 
conviction of a serious crime, constitutes a security risk, or has firmly 
resettled in a third country.60  Additionally, an asylum applicant usu-
ally must request asylum within one year of entering the United 
States.61 
Asylum applicants can request alternative forms of relief, such as 
withholding of removal.62  Most cases that decide an applicant’s eligi-
bility for asylum also determine eligibility for withholding of remov-
al.63  As opposed to asylum, which is a discretionary form of relief,64 
withholding of removal is a mandatory form of relief.65  Yet, with-
holding of removal is a less appealing form of relief because it puts a 
heightened burden on the applicant66 and grants a lesser immigration 
status.67 
 
 60. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(b)(2) (West 2009). 
 61. See 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1158(a)(2)(B), 1158(a)(2)(D) (West 2009) (permitting the 
consideration of an asylum application filed after the one year deadline if the appli-
cant “demonstrates . . . the existence of changed circumstances which materially af-
fect the applicant’s eligibility for asylum or extraordinary circumstances relating to 
the delay in filing an application.”) 
 62. See generally RICHARD D. STEEL, STEEL ON IMMIGRATION LAW § 8:15 (2d ed. 
2010) (providing an overview of withholding of removal); GORDON, MAILMAN & 
YALE-LOEHR, supra note 53, at § 33.06 (presenting an overview of withholding of 
removal). 
 63. See STEEL, supra note 62, at § 8:15. 
 64. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(b)(1) (West 2009) (establishing that “[t]he Secretary of 
Homeland Security or the Attorney General may grant asylum”) (emphasis added). 
 65. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1231(b)(3)(A) 
(West 2005) (mandating that “the Attorney General may not remove an alien to a 
country if the Attorney General decides that the alien’s life or freedom would be 
threatened in that country because of the alien’s race, religion, nationality, member-
ship in a particular social group, or political opinion”) (emphasis added). 
 66. See STEEL, supra note 62, at § 8:8 (citing I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 
421 (1987)) (noting that the Supreme Court determined that asylum has a lesser 
standard than the clear probability standard required for withholding of removal). 
 67. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 209, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1159 (West 2010) 
(mandating that asylum applicants are eligible for permanent resident status); 
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 429 n.6 (noting that unlike asylum applicants, those 
who have obtained withholding of removal are not eligible to become permanent res-
idents); STEEL, supra note 62, at § 8:15 (2010) (noting that withholding of removal 
does not result in legal permanent resident status and only continues as long as eligi-
bility for withholding of removal can be demonstrated). 
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Depending on whether the asylum application is affirmative68 or 
defensive,69 an asylum case can be decided in an asylum office or in 
proceedings.70  After an interview at a local asylum office, asylum of-
ficers decide affirmative asylum applications.71  An IJ adjudicates 
both affirmative asylum applications, referred by an asylum officer 
for hearings, and defensive asylum applications.72  On appeal, the case 
goes before the BIA.73  Further appeal can bring the case to a federal 
circuit court.74 
When an asylum case reaches the circuit courts, the relationship 
between the administrative decisions of the BIA and the judicial deci-
sions of the circuit courts has two aspects.  First, the decisions of a cir-
cuit court are binding on the BIA when it considers cases arising in 
that circuit.75  Second, in certain circumstances, the circuit courts are 
required to give Chevron deference to administrative decisions of the 
BIA.76  The landmark Chevron decision addressed whether the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency’s decision regarding polluting devices 
 
 68. Affirmative asylum applications are filed by noncitizens in valid nonimmi-
grant status. See GORDON, MAILMAN & YALE-LOEHR, supra note 53, at § 34.02. 
 69. Defensive asylum applications can be filed either as “a defensive action in re-
sponse to expedited removal proceedings” or as “a defensive application filed with an 
immigration judge (IJ) in response to regular removal proceedings.” Id. 
 70. See STEEL, supra note 62, at § 8:9, 8:12 (providing an overview of asylum pro-
cedure); GORDON, MAILMAN & YALE-LOEHR, supra note 53, at § 34.02 (describing 
the procedures involved in an asylum application). 
 71. See STEEL, supra note 62, at §§ 8:9, 8:12; GORDON, MAILMAN & YALE-LOEHR, 
supra note 53, at § 34.02. 
 72. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.2(b) (2011) (determining the jurisdiction of IJs); GORDON, 
MAILMAN & YALE-LOEHR, supra note 53, at § 34.02. 
 73. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(9) (2011) (determining the BIA’s appellate jurisdic-
tion over IJ asylum decisions); STEEL, supra note 62, at § 8:12; GORDON, MAILMAN & 
YALE-LOEHR, supra note 53, at § 34.02. 
 74. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2005); STEEL, supra note 62, at § 8:12; GORDON, MAIL-
MAN & YALE-LOEHR, supra note 53, at § 34.02. 
 75. See Singh v. Ilchert, 63 F.3d 1501, 1508 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing NLRB v. Ash-
kenazy Prop. Mgmt. Corp., 817 F.2d 74, 75 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied 501 U.S. 1217 
(1991)) (asserting that “[a] federal agency is obligated to follow circuit precedent in 
cases originating within that circuit” in the context of the BIA’s failure to discuss and 
distinguish Ninth Circuit precedent); Memorandum from Joseph E. Langlois, Chief, 
Asylum Div., to All Asylum Office Staff (Mar. 2, 2010), available at 
http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/2010/Asylum-Ramos-Div-2-mar-
2010.pdf (“The Seventh Circuit’s decision is binding on those asylum cases arising 
within the jurisdiction of the Seventh Circuit. Within the Seventh Circuit, former 
gang membership may form a particular social group if the former membership is 
immutable and the group of former gang members is socially distinct.”). 
 76. See Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 
(1984). 
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was based on a reasonable interpretation of the Clean Air Act.77  In 
Chevron, the Court mandated a two-step process for courts reviewing 
an agency’s construction of the statute that the agency applied.78 
Chevron calls for different approaches to judicial statutory inter-
pretation depending on whether or not Congress has addressed the 
precise issue in the case.79  First, if Congress has clearly spoken on the 
precise issue, then the agency and the court must give effect to Con-
gress’ intent.80  But the court must reject administrative decisions that 
contravene congressional intent because the court is the final authori-
ty on statutory interpretation.81  Second, if Congress has not ad-
dressed the precise issue, a court can construe the statute only if there 
is an absence of a reasonable administrative interpretation of the is-
sue.82  When the administrative agency has already construed a stat-
ute that is silent or ambiguous on a specific issue, the court must de-
cide whether the agency’s statutory construction is permissible.83 
The issue of the meaning of PSG falls under the second step of the 
Chevron analysis.84  Given that PSG is not defined in the INA,85 
“Congress did not speak on the issue of what constitutes a ‘particular 
social group,’ one of the five listed categories that qualify for refu-
gee . . . within the meaning of the INA.”86  The BIA construes the 
term PSG in cases determining whether an asylum applicant’s pur-
ported PSG is cognizable.87  In cases where PSG is at issue, Chevron 
 
 77. See id. at 840. 
 78. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 444-50 (1987) (rejecting the BIA’s 
legal interpretation of asylum provisions as contrary to the intent of Congress); Chev-
ron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 (citations omitted) (“When a court reviews an agency’s con-
struction of the statute which it administers, it is confronted with two questions.  First 
. . . is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at 
issue.  If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter . . . .  If, however, 
the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at is-
sue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be 
necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation.  Rather, if the statute is 
silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is 
whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”). 
See generally 6-51 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 51.01 (2010) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 
837). 
 79. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. 
 80. See id. 
 81. See id. 
 82. See id. 
 83. See id. 
 84. See, e.g., Castillo-Arias v. Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 1190, 1196 (11th Cir. 2006). 
 85. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 86. Castillo-Arias, 446 F.3d at 1196. 
 87. See, e.g., id. 
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requires the circuit courts to decide whether the BIA’s interpretation 
of PSG is a permissible statutory construction.88 
B. International Origins of U.S. Asylum Law 
U.S. asylum law fits within the larger framework of international 
law.  Specifically, the definition of refugee in U.S. asylum law comes 
from a treaty that lays out the United States’ obligations under inter-
national refugee law.89  Under the Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees (“1951 Convention”),90 a “refugee” is defined as some-
one who: 
[O]wing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is una-
ble or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protec-
tion of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being out-
side the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such 
events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.91 
The Convention and the travaux préparatoires92 do not define 
PSG.93  As part of the definition of refugee, the meaning of PSG is 
 
 88. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. 
 89. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 1101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42) 
(West 2006); 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 
U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter 1967 Protocol]; Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees, art. 1, opened for signature July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 
U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter 1951 Convention]. 
 90. The United States ratified the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refu-
gees, which incorporated the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.  
See 1967 Protocol, supra note 89, art. 1 (acceding to the 1967 Protocol, the United 
States became a party to the treaty in 1968); JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF 
REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 111 (2005) (explaining how the 1967 Proto-
col did not amend the 1951 Convention but instead incorporated the provisions of the 
1951 Convention by reference, so by becoming a signatory to the 1967 Protocol, the 
U.S. accepted the terms of the 1951 Convention). 
 91. 1951 Convention, supra note 89, art. 1(A)(2). 
 92. Travaux préparatoires are “[m]aterials used in preparing the ultimate form of 
an agreement or statute, and esp., of an international treaty; the draft or legislative 
history of a treaty.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
 93. See Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1239 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, Summary Rec. of 
the 3d Mtg., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.3 at 14 and ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STA-
TUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 219 (1966)) (noting that the history of the 
international agreement does not shed “much light on the meaning of the phrase 
‘particular social group’” because “membership in a particular social group” was add-
ed as an “afterthought” to the 1951 Convention after the Swedish representative pro-
posed the language explaining only that “experience has shown that certain refugees 
had been persecuted because they belonged to particular social groups.”); Maryellen 
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significant for state parties and individuals seeking asylum.94  The 
Refugee Act of 1980 adopted the definition of refugee from the rati-
fied 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (“1967 Proto-
col”), which incorporated the 1951 Convention’s definition of refu-
gee.95  Congress implemented the United States’ international asylum 
obligations in the Refugee Act of 1980.96  In addition, Congress codi-
fied a definition of refugee that the U.S. Supreme Court described as 
“virtually identical” to the definition of refugee in the 1951 Conven-
tion.97  Therefore, the definition of refugee in U.S. statutory law 
comes directly from international law.98 
 
Fullerton, A Comparative Look at Refugee Status Based on Persecution Due to 
Membership in a Particular Social Group, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 505, 509-10 (1993) 
(quoting U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.3, at 14 (1951)) (discussing how the Swedish dele-
gate who proposed the incorporation of social group simply stated that “certain refu-
gees have been persecuted because they belonged to particular social groups,” which 
does not help determine the meaning of social group); Elyse Wilkinson, Comment, 
Examining the Board of Immigration Appeals’ Social Visibility Requirement for Vic-
tims of Gang Violence Seeking Asylum, 62 ME. L. REV. 387, 401 (2010) (noting how 
the 1951 Convention did not define social group for the U.S or the international 
community). 
 94. Walker, supra note 33, at 583 (citing PIRKKO KOURULA, BROADENING THE 
EDGES: REFUGEE DEFINITION AND INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION REVISITED 40 
(1997)) (noting that “[d]efining a refugee is not an inconsequential matter; rather, it 
is of practical importance and has significant consequences for both States and indi-
viduals”). 
 95. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42) (West 2006); Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 
(1980); 1967 Protocol, supra note 89, art. 1 (ratifying the 1967 Protocol, the United 
States became a party to the treaty in 1968); 1951 Convention, supra note 89, art. 
1(A)(2).  The 1967 Protocol is persuasive authority governing domestic asylum law.  
See 1967 Protocol, supra note 89, art. 1; Abdelwahed v. INS, 22 F. App’x 811, 815 
(9th Cir. 2001) (holding that 1967 Protocol does not give the alien any rights beyond 
what is in U.S. immigration statutes and explaining that “the Protocol itself . . . is only 
a guide in determining Congressional intent”).  The majority view is that that the 
1967 Protocol is nonself-executing, meaning that the 1967 Protocol is not binding.  
See Abdelwahed, 22 F. App’x at 815 (asserting that the 1967 Protocol is not self-
executing); Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Baker, 949 F.2d 1109, 1110 (11th Cir. 1991) (hold-
ing that Article 33 of the 1967 Protocol is not self-executing); Bret Thiele, Persecu-
tion On Account Of Gender: A Need For Refugee Law Reform, 11 HASTINGS WOM-
EN’S L.J. 221, 223 (2000).  See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111, § 111 cmt. h, i (1987) (providing an 
overview of how nonself-executing treaties are persuasive authority, as opposed to 
mandatory authority, which courts are not obligated to follow). 
 96. See Patrick J. Glen, Is the United States Really Not a Safe Third Country?: A 
Contextual Critique of the Federal Court of Canada’s Decision in Canadian Council 
for Refugees, et al. v. Her Majesty the Queen, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 587, 615 (2008) 
(noting that the text and practice of U.S. asylum law is commensurate with the inter-
national provisions governing asylum). 
 97. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 437 (1987) (stating that the Con-
gressional definition of refugee and the definition of refugee in the 1951 Convention 
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The international law framework for the definition of PSG in the 
United States comes from the international treaties discussed above, 
and from the guidelines of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (“UNHCR”).  The 2002 UNHCR Guidelines shed light 
on the meaning of PSG in U.S. asylum law.99  The UNHCR Guide-
lines instruct State parties to the 1967 Protocol to determine whether 
a PSG has a common protected characteristic, and only if there is no 
protected characteristic, to determine whether society recognizes the 
group.100  Although the UNHCR Guidelines, a complement to the 
UNHCR Handbook,101 are not binding on the United States, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has given the UNHCR Handbook considerable 
weight in informing the meaning of the 1967 Protocol.102  In addition, 
both the BIA and the circuit courts have referred to the UNHCR 
Handbook and Guidelines in determining the meaning of PSG.103  
 
Article 1(2) are “virtually identical”); Glen, supra note 96, at 615 (noting that the text 
and practice of U.S. asylum law is commensurate with the international provisions 
governing asylum). 
 98. See Immigration and Nationality Act,8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42) (West 2006); 
1967 Protocol, supra note 89, art. 1; 1951 Convention, supra note 89, art. 1. 
 99. See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidelines on Int’l Protection: “Mem-
bership of a Particular Social Group” Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 
1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, U.N. 
Doc. HCR/GIP/02/02, at 3 (May 7, 2002) [hereinafter UNHCR, Guidelines] (provid-
ing interpretive legal guidelines to State parties of the 1951 Protocol and/or 1967 Pro-
tocol regarding the meaning of “particular social group”). 
 100. See id. at 3-4 (stating that “a particular social group is a group of persons who 
share a common characteristic other than their risk of being persecuted, or who are 
perceived as a group by society” and that “[i]f a claimant alleges a social group that is 
based on a characteristic determined to be neither unalterable or fundamental, fur-
ther analysis should be undertaken to determine whether the group is nonetheless 
perceived as a cognizable group in that society”); see also Hathaway & Foster, supra 
note 30, at 480-84, 489-90 (discussing how the UNHCR Guidelines purport to adopt a 
merged framework using both the protected characteristics approach and the social 
perception test, but do not succeed in doing so, and providing an overview of the 
merits and criticisms of the protected characteristics approach and the social percep-
tion test). 
 101. See UNHCR, Guidelines, supra note 99, at 1. 
 102. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 438-39 n.22 (1987) (noting that alt-
hough the UNHCR Handbook does not have “the force of law . . . the Handbook 
provides significant guidance in construing the Protocol, to which Congress sought to 
conform [and] [i]t has been widely considered useful in giving content to the obliga-
tions that the Protocol establishes”). 
 103. See, e.g., Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 668 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing the 
UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status 
(Geneva 1992)) (referring to the UNHCR Handbook as support for the statement 
that a PSG does not have to be defined narrowly); Castillo-Arias v. Att’y Gen., 446 
F.3d 1190 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 436-37); Castellano-
Chacon v. INS, 341 F.3d 533, 546-47 (6th Cir. 2003); In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 
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The UNHCR Guidelines, 1951 Convention, and 1967 Protocol are 
important sources of international law for determining the definition 
of PSG in U.S. asylum law.104  The United States’ intention to abide 
by international law is significant in determining how courts should 
define PSG. 
C. Board of Immigration Appeals and Federal Circuit Court 
Cases 
After having discussed the domestic and international framework 
for PSG, this section provides a chronological overview of BIA and 
circuit court cases that interpret PSG.  This case law serves as a criti-
cal foundation for the current circuit split on the meaning of PSG.  
The BIA’s interpretation of PSG informs the decisions of the circuit 
courts through Chevron deference.105  Additionally, the Ninth Circuit 
cases in the next section serve as important precedent for the Ninth 
Circuit’s approach today.106 
1. 1985: The Immutable Characteristics Test 
In re Acosta, the BIA’s earliest decision interpreting PSG,107 estab-
lished the immutable characteristics test.108  This test requires that a 
PSG share a common characteristic that is either unchangeable or 
should not have to be changed.109  Acosta held that a Salvadoran co-
operative organization of taxi drivers, COTAXI, does not constitute a 
 
956-57 (B.I.A. 2006) (citing UNHCR, Guidelines, supra note 99, at 2) (referring to 
the UNHCR Guidelines as support for the immutable characteristics test and the so-
cial visibility test), aff’d sub nom. Castillo-Arias v. Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 1190 (11th 
Cir. 2006); In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled on other 
grounds by In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987); UNHCR, Guide-
lines, supra note 99, at 11, 14 (affirming the reasonableness of the BIA’s decision in 
C-A- on appeal, the circuit court focused the BIA’s use of the UNHCR Guidelines 
and asserted that “[r]eference to the UNHCR Guidelines by the BIA in elucidating 
the Acosta formulation is permissible because the U.S. Supreme Court has held that 
Congress intended to conform United States refugee law with 1967 United Nations 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees”). 
 104. See supra notes 89–103 and accompanying text. 
 105. See supra notes 76–88 and accompanying text. 
 106. See infra Part II.C. 
 107. See Karen Musalo, Ruminations on In re Kasinga: The Decision’s Legacy, 7 S. 
CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 357, 366 (1998). 
 108. See In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233 (holding that a particular social group 
must have immutable characteristics and that a Salvadoran cooperative organization 
of taxi drivers, COTAXI, does not constitute a social group); GORDON, MAILMAN & 
YALE-LOEHR, supra note 53, at § 33.04. 
 109. See In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233–34. 
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PSG because it does not satisfy the immutable characteristics test.110  
In developing the immutable characteristics test, the court relied on 
the “well-established doctrine of ejusdem generis,111 meaning literally 
‘of the same kind.’  The doctrine holds that general words used in an 
enumeration with specific words should be construed in a manner 
consistent with the specific words.”112  The BIA reasoned that the 
other enumerated grounds—race, religion, nationality, and political 
opinion—are immutable characteristics that an individual cannot or 
should not be required to change.113  Based on ejusdem generis, the 
BIA held that “the phrase ‘persecution on account of membership in 
a particular social group’ . . . mean[s] persecution that is directed to-
ward an individual who is a member of a group of persons all of 
whom share a common, immutable characteristic.”114  The common 
characteristic “either is beyond the power of an individual to change 
or . . . is so fundamental to his identity or conscience that it ought not 
be required to be changed.”115 
Acosta provides the foundation for the definition of PSG.116  The 
protected characteristics approach, otherwise known as ejusdem gen-
eris, refers to the overall methodology of statutory construction first 
used by the BIA in Acosta.117  Many jurists and scholars endorse the 
protected characteristics approach, which is based on Acosta’s immu-
 
 110. See id. at 234. 
 111. See 82 C.J.S § 438 (2011) (citations omitted) (explaining that ejusdem generis 
is a “canon of statutory construction . . . [that applies] when, as part of an enumera-
tion in a statute, general words follow specific words, the general words are presumed 
to be and are construed as restricted by the particular designations; thus the general 
words include only things of the same kind, character, and nature as those specifically 
enumerated”). 
 112. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233 (citing Cleveland v. United States, 329 
U.S. 14 (1946)); 2A C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (4th ed. 
1972)). 
 113. Id. 
 114. See id. 
 115. See id. at 234. 
 116. See Marouf, supra note 47, at 51-52. See generally Hathaway & Foster, supra 
note 30 (providing an overview of the protected characteristics theory first advanced 
by Acosta’s immutable characteristics test, and describing the strengths and criticisms 
of the protected characteristics approach and of the alternative approach—the social 
perception test). 
 117. See Hathaway & Foster, supra note 30, at 480 (citing In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. 
Dec. 211).  The test from Acosta has been called the immutable characteristics test in 
subsequent cases and commentary. See In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233 (using the 
language of “common, immutable characteristic,” later coined as the name for the 
test in U.S. asylum law—the immutable characteristics test). 
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table characteristics test.118  The protected characteristics test is the 
leading approach in common law jurisdictions.119  The major criti-
cisms of the ejusdem generis approach used in Acosta include: the 
unnecessary complexity of the test as opposed to using the plain 
meaning of PSG; the test’s difficult application which requires 
knowledge of other fields such as human rights; and uncertainty as to 
whether groups perceived as deserving protection, such as street chil-
dren, will qualify for asylum under this approach.120 
 
 118. See, e.g., Ward v. Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689 (Can.); Hathaway & Foster, su-
pra note 30, at 486 (stating that in contrast to the social perception test, “the ejusdem 
generis approach is specifically conceived so as to ensure a fit between the meaning 
attributed to the ‘membership of a particular social group’ ground and the other four 
Convention grounds of claim, as well as to advance the purposes of the nexus clause 
and Convention more generally. . . . As a matter of international law, the preceding 
analysis suggests that the ejusdem generis approach ought to be preferred.”).  But see 
Anjana Bahl, Home is Where the Brute Lives: Asylum Law and Gender-Based 
Claims of Persecution, 4 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 33, 46 (1997) (citations omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (noting that Acosta’s holding that members of 
COTAXI did not constitute a PSG “has been criticized as being narrow and elitist 
and as demonstrating a class bias in the interpretation of the term particular social 
group” and that “[t]he B.I.A. neglected to consider Acosta’s case in a comprehensive 
and generous manner”); Fullerton, supra note 93, at 562 (stating that Acosta’s ap-
proach “will pose a major hurdle to many groups”). 
 119. See, e.g., Applicant S v. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs 
[2004] HCA 25, ¶ 36 (concluding in an Australian case that a PSG “must be identifi-
able by a characteristic or attribute common to all members of the group”(emphasis 
added)); Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. at 689 (Can.) (citing In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 
211) (approving the approach in Acosta in an important Canadian Supreme Court 
case that incorporated a test based on “innate, unchangeable characteristic[s]” into 
Canadian refugee law); Refugee Appeal No. 71427/99, N.Z.A.R. 545, ¶¶ 93-106 
(1999) (citing Ward, [1993] 2 SCR at 689 (Can.)) (following Ward’s protected charac-
teristics test in a New Zealand case); Islam v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, 
[1999] 2 A.C. 629 (citing In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 211) (applying Acosta’s im-
mutable characteristics test to define PSG in an important case from the United 
Kingdom); see also Marouf, supra 47, at 53-58; Crystal Doyle, Note, Isn’t “Persecu-
tion” Enough? Redefining the Refugee Definition to Provide Greater Asylum Pro-
tection to Victims of Gender-Based Persecution, 15 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & 
SOC. JUST. 519, 542-45 (2009). 
 120. See Hathaway & Foster, supra note 30, at 480-82 (explaining that criticisms of 
the protected characteristics approach include the approach’s unnecessary complexi-
ty “that could be avoided by simply giving the phrase [particular social group] its or-
dinary meaning,” difficult application “since it requires a knowledge of non-
discrimination and related areas of human rights law,” and uncertainty as to whether 
the approach will encompass arguably deserving groups such as “street children, stu-
dents, professionals, and refugee camp workers”); see also Fullerton, supra note 93, 
at 562 (noting that Acosta’s standard will pose a serious obstacle to numerous 
groups). 
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2. 2000: The Voluntary Association or Innate Characteristics Test 
One year after Acosta, the Ninth Circuit’s Sanchez-Trujillo adopt-
ed a voluntary association test, requiring that PSGs have a common 
identity based on the members’ intentional affiliations with each oth-
er.121  The court reasoned that a PSG could not simply have a distin-
guishing characteristic.122  Otherwise, “a statistical group of males 
taller than six feet” that had a greater risk of persecution than others 
would be a PSG.123  The court wanted to avoid constituting PSGs 
based on “demographic division[s].”124  This fear comes from the fact 
that “this court was evidently anxious to guard against ‘sweeping de-
mographic divisions’ that encompass a plethora of different lifestyles, 
varying interests, diverse cultures and contrary political leanings.”125  
With these motivations in mind, the court formulated a new test 
based on voluntary association.126  The Ninth Circuit explained the 
voluntary association test in the following way: 
[T]he phrase “particular social group” implies a collection of people 
closely affiliated with each other, who are actuated by some com-
mon impulse or interest.  Of central concern is the existence of a 
voluntary associational relationship among the purported members, 
which imparts some common characteristic that is fundamental to 
their identity as a member of that discrete social group.127 
Based on this test, the court held that a group of young, working 
class, urban males of military age was not a PSG.128 
In Hernandez-Montiel, the Ninth Circuit later modified the test for 
PSG.129  The court expanded the voluntary association test to better 
 
 121. See Sanchez-Trujillo v. I.N.S., 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986): see also Mi-
chael G. Heyman, Asylum, Social Group Membership and the Non-State Actor: the 
Challenge of Domestic Violence, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 767, 775 (2003) [hereinaf-
ter Heyman, Challenge of Domestic Violence] (analyzing the rationale of the 
Sanchez-Trujillo and noting how it conflicted with the BIA approach). 
 122. See Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1576-77 (holding that the definition of PSG 
depends on voluntary association and that a group of young, working class, urban 
males of military age are not a particular social group). 
 123. See id. at 1576. 
 124. See id. at 1577. 
 125. GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 359 (2d ed. 
1998). 
 126. See Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1576. 
 127. See id. 
 128. See id. at 1576-77. 
 129. See Hernandez-Montiel v. I.N.S., 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding 
that the new test for social group is based on either voluntary association or innate 
characteristics), overruled on other grounds by Thomas v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1177 
(9th Cir. 2005). 
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align it with the BIA’s immutable characteristics test.130  The Ninth 
Circuit’s new test for PSG required voluntary association or innate 
characteristics.131  For purposes of this Note, the Ninth Circuit’s test 
from Hernandez-Montiel is called the “two-alternatives test.”  Using 
the two-alternatives test, the Ninth Circuit held that gay men with 
female sexual identities were a cognizable PSG.132 
3. 2006: The Social Visibility Test and Particularity Requirement 
Following the lead of the Second Circuit,133 the BIA’s In re C-A- 
added social visibility to the analysis of PSG.134  The social visibility 
test requires that other members of the asylee’s society perceive her 
group as a PSG.135  In C-A-, the BIA reviewed various approaches to 
defining PSG, including the UNHCR Guidelines’ approach.136  From 
this review, the BIA concluded that the definition of PSG consists of 
not only the immutable characteristics test, but also requires consid-
eration of the social visibility of the group.137  The social visibility test 
requires that characteristics of the group be “recognizable and under-
 
 130. See id. (holding that voluntary association or innate characteristics define 
PSG); GORDON, MAILMAN & YALE-LOEHR, supra note 53, at § 33.04. 
 131. See Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1093 (holding that “a ‘particular social 
group’ is one united by a voluntary association, including a former association, or by 
an innate characteristic that is so fundamental to the identities or consciences of its 
members that members either cannot or should not be required to change it”); see 
also Heyman, Challenge of Domestic Violence, supra note 121, at 776 (describing 
“the Ninth Circuit’s idiosyncratic view”). 
 132. See Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1094. 
 133. See Gao v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 62, 64 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that the defini-
tion of social group would no longer be based on the voluntary association test but 
instead would be based on the immutable characteristics test with an added “visibil-
ity” requirement that the group be “identifiable to would-be persecutors”); Gomez v. 
INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991) (citations omitted); GORDON, MAILMAN & 
YALE-LOEHR, supra note 53, at § 33.04. 
 134. See In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 957 (B.I.A. 2006), aff’d sub nom. Castillo-
Arias v. Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 1190 (11th Cir. 2006); GORDON, MAILMAN & YALE-
LOEHR, supra note 53, at § 33.04; Marouf, supra note 47, at 63-65. 
 135. See In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 956-57. 
 136. See id. at 955-61; see also Marouf, supra note 47, at 63. 
 137. See In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 956-57 (citing In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 
211 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled on other grounds by In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 
439 (B.I.A. 1987)) (asserting that the BIA would “continue to adhere to the Acosta 
formulation” but would “consider[] as a relevant factor the extent to which members 
of a society perceive those with the characteristic in question as members of a social 
group”); see also Marouf, supra note 47, at 63-65 (describing how the BIA continued 
to use the immutable characteristics test while adding social visibility to the analysis 
of social group). 
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stood by others to constitute social groups.”138  The BIA held that 
“noncriminal drug informants working against the Cali drug cartel” 
were not a PSG because they lacked social visibility,139 reasoning that 
the nature of a confidential informant’s hidden identity places him 
“generally out of the public view.”140  The BIA also rejected the pur-
ported PSG because the group lacked particularity.141  Most im-
portantly, C-A- added social visibility and particularity as factors in 
the analysis of PSG.142 
C-A- mentioned a fourth factor in the analysis of PSG, which this 
Note refers to as the “circular definition test.”143  Using this test, C-A- 
excluded from the definition of a PSG any group “defined exclusively 
by the fact that [the group] is targeted for persecution.”144  There is a 
general point of consensus that 
[A] particular social group may not be defined on the basis simply of 
a shared fear of being persecuted, as to find otherwise would result 
in tautological reasoning whereby a person would be at risk of being 
persecuted because they were at risk of being persecuted—an out-
come that would also make the nexus clause superfluous . . . .145 
In other words, a PSG cannot consist of a group targeted for perse-
cution without any other unifying characteristic or recognizable 
trait.146  Without the circular definition test, a PSG defined only by 
persecution would automatically satisfy the nexus element of an asy-
lum claim, which requires persecution or fear of persecution “on ac-
count of” an unenumerated ground.147  Consequently, a circularly de-
fined PSG would make the nexus element of an asylum claim 
 
 138. In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 959. 
 139. Id. at 961. 
. 140. Id. at 960. 
 141. See id. at 957(finding that “noncriminal informants” is a group “too loosely 
defined to meet the requirement of particularity”).  The particularity requirement 
demands that a PSG not be too “amorphous” or “indeterminate.” See In re A-M-E-, 
24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 76 (B.I.A. 2007), aff’d sub nom. Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 
F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 2007); infra notes 163-164 and accompanying text. 
 142. See In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 957–60; 3-33 GORDON, MAILMAN & YALE-
LOEHR, supra note 53, at § 33.04; Marouf, supra note 47, at 63-65. 
 143. See In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 960 (citing UNHCR, Guidelines, supra note 
99, at ¶ 2) (noting that a PSG could not be defined solely by being persecuted). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Hathaway & Foster, supra note 30, at 479. 
 146. See In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 960. 
 147. See Hathaway & Foster, supra note 30, at 479; supra note 58 and accompany-
ing text. 
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unnecessary, contravening congressional intent.148  This uncontrover-
sial reasoning149 has been adopted by many circuit courts.150 
The commentary and response to C-A- highlight the strengths and 
weaknesses of the decision.  Some commentators praise C-A- and the 
addition of social visibility to the analysis of social group.151  While 
others strongly criticize the decision as inaccurately portraying cases 
from the past and not acknowledging a departure from precedent.152 
Some commentators contend that C-A- mischaracterized the 
UNHCR Guidelines as support for the social visibility test.153  Com-
 
 148. Cf. Hathaway & Foster, supra note 30, at 479 (discussing the same circularity 
problem in the international context). 
 149. See id. (noting that there is a general consensus around the requirement that a 
PSG not be defined exclusively by persecution). 
 150.  See, e.g., Kante v. Holder, 634 F.3d 321, 327 (6th Cir. 2011) (rejecting a PSG 
of “women subjected to rape as a method of government control” because it is circu-
larly defined by persecution); Bayavarpu v. Holder, 390 F. App’x 353 (5th Cir. 2010) 
(rejecting a PSG because the group is defined exclusively by being targeted for perse-
cution); Velasquez-Garzon v. Att’y Gen., 387 F. App’x 295, 297-98 (3d Cir. 2010) (re-
jecting PSG, among other reasons, for being defined only by persecution); Lushaj v. 
Holder, 380 F. App’x 41, 43 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting a PSG cannot be circularly defined 
only by persecution); Scatambuli v. Holder, 558 F.3d 53, 59 (1st Cir. 2009) (citations 
omitted) (asserting that a PSG must not be “defined exclusively by the fact that its 
members have been targeted for persecution”); Nkwonta v. Mukasey, 295 F. App’x 
279, 286 (10th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted) (asserting that “it is an impermissible cir-
cular definition, defining a group in terms of those who suffer persecution”); Castillo-
Arias v. Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 1190, 1198 (11th Cir. 2006) (noting that “risk of persecu-
tion alone does not create a particular social group”); Rreshpja v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 
551, 556 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting that “a social group may not be circularly defined by 
the fact that it suffers persecution.  The individuals in the group must share a narrow-
ing characteristic other than their risk of being persecuted.”). 
 151. See, e.g., David A. Martin, Major Developments in Asylum Law over the Past 
Year, 83 No. 34 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1889, 1894 (2006) (using the UNHCR 
Guidelines and Second Circuit precedent to support the assertion that the addition of 
social visibility to the analysis of social group “appears to be on more solid ground”). 
 152. See Marouf, supra note 47, at 63-65 (criticizing C-A- as not acknowledging a 
departure from precedent, not adopting the social perception test as laid out in the 
UNHCR Guidelines and incorrectly describing how past cases were based on socially 
visible characteristics). 
 153. See Harris & Weibel, supra note 40, at 13; Marouf, supra note 47, at 63-65 
(criticizing C-A- as not adopting the social perception test as laid out in the UNHCR 
Guidelines); see also Danielle L.C. Beach, Battlefield of Gendercide: Forced Mar-
riages and Gender-Based Grounds for Asylum and Related Relief, 09-12 IMMIGR. 
BRIEFINGS 1 (citing In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled on oth-
er grounds by In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987)); Marouf, supra 
note 47, at 49) (“Marouf’s insightful analysis found that the Board’s ‘social visibility’ 
requirement diverges from the international accepted approach of discerning a social 
group, undermines the principle framework of analysis set forth in Acosta, and ‘will 
lead to incoherent, inconsistent decisions’ that have no basis under international 
law.”). 
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mentators point out that the BIA’s interpretation of social visibility 
significantly diverges from the UNHCR’s interpretation.154  The 
UNHCR follows both the protected characteristics and the social per-
ception approaches, and presents them as alternative approaches to 
defining PSG.155  In contrast to the protected characteristics approach 
that focuses on the internal characteristics of a group,156 the social 
perception approach looks at the external perception of a group in a 
given society and the perception of persecutors.157 
The BIA’s interpretation of “social visibility” in C-A-, however, di-
verged from the international community’s understanding of the ‘so-
cial perception’ approach, as it focused on the visibility of group 
members rather than whether the group as a whole was recognized 
by society, and stressed a subjective rather than an objective stand-
ard.158 
In three subsequent cases, A-M-E-, S-E-G- and E-A-G-, the BIA 
established the use of social visibility as a requirement for a PSG.159  
This further diverges from the UNHCR Guidelines which present 
protected characteristics and social perception as alternative ap-
proaches, not dual requirements, to defining PSG.160  The UNHCR 
presented its own view on the BIA’s social visibility test in an amicus 
brief asserting that the BIA’s social visibility test was inconsistent 
with the UNHCR Guidelines.161  The UNHCR’s amicus brief lends 
 
 154. See In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 961 (B.I.A. 2006), aff’d sub nom. Castillo-
Arias, 446 F.3d 1190; Marouf, supra note 47, at 49 (citing In re A-M-E-, 24 I. & N. 
Dec. 69 (B.I.A. 2007), aff’d sub nom. Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 
2007). 
 155. See Marouf, supra note 47, at 49. 
 156. See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
 157. See Hathaway & Foster, supra note 30, at 483 (citing Applicant “A” and Anor 
v. MIMA (1997) 190 CLR 225 (Austl.)) (noting how the social perception is em-
braced by the Australian courts, as evidenced by the leading case of Applicant A v. 
MIMA). 
 158. Marouf, supra note 47, at 49. 
 159. See In re E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 591, 594 (B.I.A. 2008); In re S-E-G-, 24 I. & 
N. Dec. 579, 582 (B.I.A. 2008); In re A-M-E-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 73-75; GORDON, 
MAILMAN & YALE-LOEHR, supra note 53, at § 33.04; Harris & Weibel, supra note 40, 
at 5; Marouf, supra note 47, at 65-67 (discussing In re A-M-E-’s adoption of the social 
visibility test as an additional requirement (citing In re A-M-E-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69)). 
 160. See Marouf, supra note 47, at 49; supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
 161. See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Brief of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees as Amicus Curiae in the matter of Michelle Thomas et 
al. (2007) [hereinafter UNHCR, Amicus Curiae in Thomas] (amicus brief for an un-
published BIA case); Elizabeth A. James, Comment, Is the U.S. Fulfilling Its Obliga-
tions Under the 1951 Refugee Convention? The Colombian Crisis in Context, 33 
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support to the divergence of the BIA’s social visibility test in C-A- 
from the UNHCR’s approach in the Guidelines.162 
4. 2007-2008: The Particularity Requirement 
The BIA’s In re A-M-E-, In re S-E-G- and In re E-A-G- estab-
lished social visibility and particularity as requirements for PSG quali-
fication.163  Particularity requires that the PSG not be “amorphous,” 
“indeterminate,” or “too subjective, inchoate, and variable to provide 
the sole basis for membership in a particular social group.”164  These 
cases shifted the focus of the analysis away from immutable charac-
teristics to social visibility either by relying on social visibility to inval-
idate a PSG that satisfied the immutable characteristics test, or by 
discussing social visibility in significantly greater detail than immuta-
ble characteristics.165  These decisions, together with C-A-, were de-
signed to “give greater specificity” to the definition of PSG.166  In S-E-
G-, the BIA rejects the PSG of youths who resist gang membership 
for lack of social visibility and particularity.167  This case provides a 
critical foundation for understanding the Ninth Circuit’s special 
treatment of youths who resist gang membership.168  The BIA and 
circuit court cases mentioned in this section set the stage for the dis-
 
N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 455, 504 (2008); Marouf, supra note 47, at 65 (citations 
omitted); Wilkinson, supra note 93, at 410. 
 162. See UNHCR, Amicus Curiae in Thomas, supra note 161; James, supra note 
161, at 504 (2008); Marouf, supra note 47, at 65; Wilkinson, supra note 93, at 410. 
 163. See supra note 159. 
 164. In re A-M-E-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 76. 
 165. See In re E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 591, 593-96 (B.I.A. 2008) (analyzing the al-
leged PSG mostly under the social visibility test with less attention given to analysis 
under the immutable characteristics test); In re S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 582-84, 
586-88 (B.I.A. 2008) (noting that an age-based PSG might be cognizable under im-
mutable characteristics but holding that youths who resist gang recruitment does not 
constitute a PSG under the social visibility test); In re A-M-E-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 73-
75 (noting that while wealth might satisfy the immutable characteristics test, the IJ 
correctly ruled that the category of wealthy Guatemalans does not constitute a PSG 
because it fails under the social visibility test). 
 166. See In re S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 582. 
 167. See id. at 585-87 (holding that the group lacked social visibility because there 
is insufficient evidence that Salvadoran youths who refuse to join gangs are seen as a 
group by society or that they suffer a higher incidence of crime than the general pop-
ulation, and holding that the group lacked particularity because “[t]hey make up a 
potentially large and diffuse segment of society, and the motivation of gang members 
in recruiting and targeting young males could arise from motivations quite apart from 
any perception that the males in question were members of a class”). 
 168. See infra Part II.C. 
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cussion of the circuit split surrounding the definition of PSG in Part 
II. 
II.  CONFLICT: THE DEFINITION OF PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP 
The circuit courts have different approaches to defining PSG in 
asylum cases.  This circuit split has significant effects because each 
circuit’s precedent binds the immigration agency’s proceedings within 
the circuit.169  This Part explains the circuit split by first discussing the 
approach of the circuit courts that follow the BIA, then by examining 
the Seventh Circuit’s approach and the subsequent Third Circuit de-
cision adopting that approach, and finally by presenting the Ninth 
Circuit’s approach.  This Part concludes with a discussion of the justi-
fications and criticisms of each approach to defining PSG. 
A. Circuits that Follow the Board of Immigration Appeals: 
Immutable Characteristics, Social Visibility, and Particularity 
The majority of circuit courts follow the BIA’s approach to defin-
ing PSG.  The First Circuit,170 Second Circuit,171 Third Circuit,172 
 
 169. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
 170. See Scatambuli v. Holder, 558 F.3d 53, 59 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing In re A-M-E-, 
24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 76 (B.I.A. 2007), aff’d sub nom. Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 
F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 2007)); In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 957, 960 (B.I.A. 2006) , aff’d 
sub nom. Castillo-Arias v. Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 1190 (11th Cir. 2006)) (establishing 
the First Circuit standard that “[i]n addition to immutability, the BIA requires that a 
‘particular social group’: (1) have ‘social visibility,’ meaning that members possess 
‘characteristics . . . visible and recognizable by others in the [native] country’; (2) be 
defined with sufficient particularity to avoid indeterminacy,” and rejecting drug 
smuggling informants as a PSG for lack of social visibility); see also Ahmed v. Hold-
er, 611 F.3d 90, 94-95 (1st Cir. 2010) (rejecting “secularized and westernized Pakistan-
is perceived to be affiliated with the United States” as a PSG for lack of particularity 
and social visibility); Larios v. Holder, 608 F.3d 105, 108-09 (1st Cir. 2010) (rejecting 
“young Guatemalan men recruited by gang members who resist such recruitment” as 
a PSG for lack of social visibility and particularity); Mendez-Barrera v. Holder, 602 
F.3d 21, 26-27 (1st Cir. 2010) (rejecting proposed PSG of “young women recruited by 
gang members who resist such recruitment” for lack of visibility and particularity); 
Faye v. Holder, 580 F.3d 37, 41-42 (1st Cir. 2009) (rejecting proposed PSG of “women 
who had a child out of wedlock/are considered adulterers because they gave birth to 
a child allegedly not their husband’s/have been abused by their husbands” based on 
lack of social visibility and particularity). 
 171. See Lushaj v. Holder, 380 F. App’x 41, 43 (2d Cir. 2010) (rejecting proposed 
PSG of “women whom ‘members of the Haklaj gang wished to kidnap . . . and force . 
. . into prostitution, at least in part to punish [their] family members for their political 
activities in Albania’” for lack of social visibility because not perceived as a discrete 
group by Albanian society); Qeta v. Holder, 378 F. App’x 93, 94 (2d Cir. 2010) (re-
jecting PSG of “young single women in Albania who do not have male relatives to 
protect them from sex traffickers” because the group lacked a common immutable 
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Fourth Circuit,173 Sixth Circuit,174 Eighth Circuit,175 Tenth Circuit,176 
and  Eleventh Circuit177 use the social visibility test and particularity 
 
characteristic, social visibility, and particularity); Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 
70, 72-74 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding, after a discussion of social visibility and particulari-
ty, that “[t]he BIA’s interpretation of the statutory phrase ‘particular social group’ . . . 
was . . . reasonable” and rejecting PSG of “affluent Guatemalans” for lack of particu-
larity). 
 172. See Velasquez-Garzon v. Att’y Gen., 387 F. App’x 295 (3d Cir. 2010) (reject-
ing proposed PSG of “FARC [Revolutionary Armed Forces in Columbia] victims” 
for lack of immutable characteristic, and rejecting proposed PSG of “person[s] who 
would be able to provide some service to the FARC” as too vague, lacking particular-
ity); Galindo-Torres v. Att’y Gen., 348 F. App’x 814, 816, 817-18 (3d Cir. 2009) (re-
jecting “influential, respected business people who refuse to aid, join or support the 
FARC” as PSG for lack of social visibility and particularity); cf. Gomez-Zuluaga v. 
Att’y Gen., 527 F.3d 330, 348 (3d Cir. 2008) (accepting PSG of “women who have es-
caped involuntary servitude after being abducted and confined by the FARC” under 
the immutable characteristics test). 
 173. See Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117, 125-26 (4th Cir. 2011) (find-
ing that the family members of “those who actively oppose gangs in El Salvador by 
agreeing to be prosecutorial witnesses” satisfies immutable characteristics, social visi-
bility and particularity); Lizama v. Holder, 629 F.3d. 440, 444 (4th Cir. 2011) (reject-
ing the proposed PSG of “young, Americanized well-off Salvadoran male deportees 
with criminal histories who oppose gangs” for lack of immutability, particularity, and 
social visibility); Bermudez-Botero v. Holder, 375 F. App’x 314, 316 (4th Cir. 2010) 
(citing In re A-M-E-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69; In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951) (rejecting 
PSG based on the BIA’s analytical framework set out in C-A- and A-M-E-); Contre-
ras-Martinez v. Holder, 346 F. App’x 956, 958-59 (4th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (reject-
ing “adolescents in El Salvador who refuse to join the gangs of that country because 
of their opposition to the gangs’ violent and criminal activities” as PSG for lack of 
social visibility and particularity). 
 174. See Khozhaynova v. Holder, 641 F.3d 187, 195 (6th Cir. 2011) (rejecting PSG 
of “business owners who refuses [sic] to pay for protection from the mafia”); Qu v. 
Holder, 618 F.3d 602, 607 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Gao v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 62 (2d Cir. 
2006)) (holding that “women in China who have been subjected to forced marriage 
and involuntary servitude” constitute a PSG based on the immutable characteristics 
test); Bonilla-Morales, 607 F.3d 1132, 1137 (6th Cir. 2010) (asserting that, although 
the court did not need to reach the issue of PSG, the PSG likely does not meet the 
social visibility or particularity requirements); Urbina-Mejia v. Holder, 597 F.3d 360, 
366-67 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that former gang member is a PSG because “it is im-
possible for Urbina-Mejia to change his membership in the group of the former 18th 
Street gang members,” and noting that “[i]t is not that he is unwilling to cast off gang 
membership; indeed, he came to the United States in order to escape the gang,” but 
stating that “once one has left the gang, one is forever a former member of that 
gang”). 
 175. See Costanza v. Holder, 647 F.3d 749, 753 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding that pro-
posed PSG of “a family that experienced gang violence” failed for lack of social visi-
bility and particularity, and proposed PSG of “persons resistant to gang violence” 
failed under particularity); Davila-Mejia v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 624, 628-29 (8th Cir. 
2008) (rejecting proposed PSG of Guatemalan family business owners for lack of 
“social visibility to be perceived as a group by society” and for lack of particularity as 
it was “too amorphous to adequately describe a social group”). 
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as requirements for a cognizable PSG.  Even though the immutable 
characteristics test has a less important role in the analysis of PSG, 
these circuit courts continue to refer to the immutable characteristics 
test from Acosta in their cases.178 
The social visibility test, from C-A-, A-M-E and other BIA deci-
sions, has been engrafted on top of the immutable characteristics test 
and often plays a significant role in the analysis of PSG.179  In Men-
dez-Barrera, the First Circuit relied on social visibility as a basis for 
 
 176. See Rivera-Barrientos v. Holder, 658 F.3d 1222, 1228-29, 1231, 1235 (10th Cir. 
2011) (holding that PSG of “women in El Salvador between the ages of 12 and 25 
who resisted gang recruitment” fails social visibility and that the group meets the 
freshly-adopted particularity requirement).  
 177.  See Pierre v. U.S. Att’y General, No. 09-1624, 2011 WL 2506053, at *2 (11th 
Cir. June 24, 2011) (rejecting argument that social visibility should not be the law be-
cause of the Eleventh Circuit’s earlier decision affirming the use of the social visibil-
ity test in Castillo-Arias); Vasquez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 345 F. App’x 441, 446-47 (11th 
Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (rejecting PSG of “young Salvadoran students who expressly 
oppose gang practices and values and who wish to protect their family members 
against such practices” for lack of social visibility and particularity). 
 178. See Rivera-Barrientos, 658 F.3d at 1229 (referring to immutable characteris-
tics without relying on it because the BIA did not base its decision on the immutable 
characteristics test); Bonilla-Morales, 607 F.3d at 1137 (quoting Castellano-Chacon v. 
INS, 341 F.3d 533 (6th Cir. 2003), overruled on other grounds by In re Mogharrabi, 
19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987)) (using the language from Acosta of “common, im-
mutable characteristic”); Contreras-Martinez, 346 F. App’x at 958; Davila-Mejia, 531 
F.3d at 629; Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70, 73-74 (2d Cir. 2007); Galindo-
Torres, 348 F. App’x 814, 817 (3d Cir. 2009) (mentioning but not relying on the im-
mutable characteristics test because the BIA did not base its decision on immutabil-
ity); Vasquez, 345 F. App’x at 445; Scatambuli v. Holder, 558 F.3d 53, 59 (1st Cir. 
2009) (noting the BIA requires that the purported PSG satisfy the immutable charac-
teristics test); supra Part I.C.1. 
 179. See Rivera-Barrientos, 658 F.3d at 1234 (citations omitted) (holding that “we 
therefore join those circuits that have accepted the BIA’s social visibility test in in-
terpreting the statute”); Bonilla-Morales, 607 F.3d at 1137 (noting that “an alleged 
social group must be . . . socially visible”); Contreras-Martinez, 346 F. App’x at 958 
(noting that the a social group must have social visibility); Galindo-Torres, 348 F. 
App’x at 817 (citations omitted) (noting that a social group “must . . . exhibit a shared 
characteristic that is socially visible to others in the community”); Scatambuli, 558 
F.3d at 59 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (following the 
BIA’s approach where “the BIA requires that a particular social group . . . have so-
cial visibility”); Vasquez, 345 F. App’x at 446 (citations omitted) (holding that the 
“purported group . . . fails the social visibility test” because they are not “generally 
recognizable by others in the community”); Davila-Mejia, 531 F.3d at 629 (holding 
that “petitioners . . . failed to establish that their status as ‘competing family business 
owners’ gave them sufficient social visibility to be perceived as a group by society”); 
Ucelo-Gomez, 509 F.3d at 73 (affirming the BIA’s social visibility test); see also supra 
notes 134-138, 142 and accompanying text (defining the social visibility test and dis-
cussing its development in BIA precedential case-law). 
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rejecting the PSG.180  In this case, the First Circuit held that “young 
women recruited by gang members who resist such recruitment” did 
not constitute a PSG for lack of social visibility.181  The court ex-
plained that to satisfy social visibility, a group “must be generally rec-
ognized in the community as a cohesive group.”182  In discussing social 
visibility, the court highlighted that “[t]he petitioner failed to provide 
even a scintilla of evidence to this effect.  By the same token, she 
failed to pinpoint any group characteristics that render members of 
the putative group socially visible in El Salvador.”183 
The additional requirement of particularity also plays an important 
role in the analysis of PSG.184  In Ucelo-Gomez, the Second Circuit 
held that “affluent Guatemalans” could not be a cognizable PSG for 
lack of particularity.185  The court discussed the BIA’s observation 
that if affluence in Guatemala were defined as not living in poverty, 
then twenty percent of the population would be considered afflu-
ent.186  The court noted that: 
[T]he BIA must not mean that a group’s size can itself be a sound 
reason for finding a lack of particularity.  Instead, we interpret the 
BIA’s observation as merely illustrating how “the concept of wealth 
 
 180. See Mendez-Barrera v. Holder, 602 F.3d 21, 26-27 (1st Cir. 2010). 
 181. See id. (holding that young men who resisted gang membership did not consti-
tute a PSG based on lack of social visibility and particularity). 
 182. Id. at 26 (citations omitted). 
 183. Id. 
 184. See Rivera-Barrientos, 658 F.3d at 1231 (holding that “we therefore defer to 
the BIA’s formulation of ‘particular social group’ as requiring the group be defined 
with particularity”); Lizama v. Holder, 629 F.3d 440, 447 (4th Cir. 2011); Bermudez-
Botero v. Holder, 375 F. App’x 314, 316 (4th Cir. 2010) (noting that particularity is a 
required criterion for a cognizable PSG); Bonilla-Morales, 607 F.3d at 1137 (noting 
that “[a]n alleged social group must be . . . particular”); Contreras-Martinez, 346 F. 
App’x at 958-59 (noting that a social group cannot be “inchoate,” “diffuse,” or inde-
terminate); Galindo-Torres, 348 F. App’x at 817 (citations omitted) (noting that a so-
cial group must “be defined with sufficient particularity”); Scatambuli, 558 F.3d at 59 
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (following the BIA’s approach 
where “the BIA requires that a particular social group . . . be defined with sufficient 
particularity to avoid indeterminacy”); Vasquez, 345 F. App’x at 446 (citations omit-
ted) (concluding that the “proposed group lacks particularity . . . because its members 
‘make up a potentially large and diffuse segment of society’”); Davila-Mejia, 531 F.3d 
at 629 (concluding that petitioners failed to establish that the social group was suffi-
ciently particular); Ucelo-Gomez, 509 F.3d at 73 (affirming the BIA’s particularity 
requirement); see also supra notes 163-164 and accompanying text. 
 185. Ucelo-Gomez, 509 F.3d at 72-74 (holding that “affluent Guatemalans” were 
not a PSG for lack of social visibility and particularity). 
 186. See id. at 73 (citing In re A-M-E-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 76 n.8). 
STERNBERG_CHRISTENSEN 3/9/2012  9:06 PM 
274 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXIX 
is so indeterminate”—the purported social group could vary from 
one to twenty percent of the total population.187 
The court then explained that “[t]his indeterminacy is a relevant 
consideration in light of In re C-A-’s concerns about groups that are 
‘too loosely defined to meet the requirement of particularity.’”188  An 
important rationale underlying the approach of the circuit courts that 
follow the BIA is the application of Chevron deference to the BIA’s 
definition of PSG, which will be discussed further at the end of Part 
II.189 
B. Third and Seventh Circuits: Immutable Characteristics and 
Rejection of Social Visibility and Particularity 
Continuing to adhere to the immutable characteristics test, the dis-
senting circuits have rejected the social visibility test and the particu-
larity requirement.190  In Gatimi v. Holder, the Seventh Circuit reject-
ed the BIA’s social visibility test.191  The Court held that “defectors 
from the Mungiki” constitute a PSG.192  Distinguishing the present 
case from the Supreme Court’s Gonzales v. Thomas, which directed 
the circuit courts to give deference to the BIA’s definition of PSG, 
the Seventh Circuit contrasted the prior silence of the BIA on the 
PSG at issue in Thomas with the inconsistent use of social visibility in 
past BIA decisions.193  Chevron deference does not apply where the 
agency’s ruling is inconsistent with past decisions.194  Judge Posner as-
 
 187. Id. at 73 n.2 (citing In re A-M-E-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 76). 
 188. See id. (citing In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 957 (B.I.A. 2006), aff’d sub 
nom. Castillo-Arias v. Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 1190 (11th Cir. 2006)). 
 189. See infra Part II.D.1 (explaining the role of Chevron deference in the ap-
proaches of the circuit courts). 
 190. See Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen., No. 08-4564, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 
22565, at *67 (3d Cir. Nov. 8, 2011) (rejecting social visibility and particularity); Beni-
tez Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426, 431 (7th Cir. 2009) (rejecting the particularity re-
quirement); Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615-16 (7th Cir. 2009) (rejecting the so-
cial visibility test). 
 191. See Gatimi, 578 F.3d at 615-16; see also Eugenia Pyntikova, Seventh Circuit 
Decision in Gatimi v. Holder Rejects Social Visibility as Necessary Criterion for 
Membership in a “Particular Social Group”, 24 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 101, 101-05 (2009). 
 192. See Gatimi, 578 F.3d at 616.  The Mungiki is a violent Kenyan political and 
religious group that compels the wives of members and defectors to undergo female 
genital mutilation. 
 193. See id. at 615-16 (citing Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183 (2006) (per 
curiam)) (discussing whether a family could be a PSG). 
 194. See Harris & Weibel, supra note 40, at 11 (explaining that Chevron does not 
apply to an agency’s inconsistent approach (citing Chevron USA v. Natural Res. Def. 
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serted that social visibility “makes no sense” and that the BIA has not 
even tried to explain the reasoning behind social visibility.195  Addi-
tionally, social visibility would lead to perverse results because “[i]f 
you are a member of a group that has been targeted for . . . persecu-
tion, you will take pains to avoid being socially visible.”196  The court 
continued by noting that “[t]he only way, on the Board’s view, that 
the Mungiki defectors can qualify as members of a particular social 
group is by pinning a target to their backs with the legend ‘I am a 
Mungiki defector.’”197  Later, in Benitez Ramos v. Holder, the Sev-
enth Circuit affirmed the rejection of the social visibility test.198  Fur-
thermore, in the dicta of Benitez Ramos, the Seventh Circuit rejected 
the particularity requirement.199 
Following the Seventh Circuit’s lead, the Third Circuit also reject-
ed social visibility and particularity.200  In Valdiviezo-Galdamez, the 
Third Circuit rejected social visibility for largely the same reasons 
that the Seventh Circuit’s Gatimi rejected this BIA test.201  Quoting 
heavily from Gatimi, Chief Judge McKee indicated his circuit’s ap-
proval of the Seventh Circuit’s approach.202  Additionally, the Third 
Circuit rejected the particularity requirement in the following way: 
[W]e are hard-pressed to discern any difference between the re-
quirement of “particularity” and the discredited requirement of “so-
cial visibility.”  Indeed, they appear to be different articulations of 
the same concept and the government’s attempt to distinguish the 
two oscillates between confusion and obfuscation . . . .  “Particulari-
ty” appears to be little more than a reworked definition of “social 
visibility” . . . .203 
Based on this understanding of particularity as a reformulation of so-
cial visibility, the court rejected particularity for the same reasons it 
rejected social visibility.204  Specifically, McKee described particularity 
as “unreasonable” because it is inconsistent with earlier BIA deci-
 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984))); Marouf, supra note 47, at 68 (citing Nat’l Cable 
& Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005)). 
 195. See Gatimi, 578 F.3d at 615. 
 196. See id. 
 197. Id. at 616 (emphasis added). 
 198. See 589 F.3d 426, 430 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 199. See id. at 431. 
 200. See Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen., No. 08-4564, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 
22565, at *67 (3d Cir. Nov. 8, 2011). 
 201. Compare id. at *53-*64, with Gatimi, 578 F.3d at 615-16. 
 202. See Valdiviezo-Galdamez, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 22565, at *56-*60. 
 203. Id. at *66-*67.  
 204. See id. 
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sions.205  Based on the inconsistency of these tests with prior BIA de-
cisions, the Third Circuit held that social visibility and particularity 
are not entitled to Chevron deference, and declined to follow the 
BIA’s approach.206 
C. Ninth Circuit: Voluntary Association or Innate 
Characteristics Test, or the Application of Chevron Deference 
In defining PSG, the Ninth Circuit has a dual approach that de-
pends on the facts of the case.207  When the BIA has decided a prece-
dential case about a very similar group, the Ninth Circuit gives Chev-
ron deference to the BIA’s approach to defining PSG.208  When the 
BIA has not ruled about a very similar group in a precedential deci-
sion, the Ninth Circuit uses its own two-alternatives test.209  The Ninth 
Circuit’s two-alternatives test for PSG requires voluntary association 
or innate characteristics.210  According to the Ninth Circuit, “[a] ‘par-
ticular social group’ is one united by a voluntary association, includ-
ing a former association, or by an innate characteristic that is so fun-
damental to the identities or consciences of its members that 
members either cannot or should not be required to change it.”211  
This two-alternatives test comes from Ninth Circuit precedent.212 
In Perdomo v. Holder, a case about a group that the BIA had not 
previously ruled on in a precedential decision, the Ninth Circuit used 
 
 205. See id. at *67. 
 206. See id. 
 207. For a recent case that does not follow this dual approach but instead seems to 
use a mix of the two approaches without giving a satisfying explanation of the court’s 
methodology, see Velasco-Cervantes v. Holder, 593 F.3d 975, 978-79 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(holding that proposed PSG failed the two-alternatives test in part because the group 
did not possess social visibility and particularity, thus presenting a mixed approach of 
the two-alternatives test and Chevron deference).  This mixed approach can be better 
understood by looking at Arteaga v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 940, 944-45 (9th Cir. 2007), 
which the Velasco-Cervantes court cited as the source for the proposition that the 
two-alternatives test is given content by social visibility and particularity. 
 208. See, e.g., Barrios v. Holder, 581 F.3d 849, 855-56, 858 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing In 
re S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 582, 583 (B.I.A. 2008)) (determining that Chevron 
deference is due to the BIA’s analysis of the proposed PSG of Guatemalan youths 
who refuse to join gangs based on the BIA’s earlier precedential decision in S-E-G-, 
which rejected those who resist recruiting by a Salvadoran gang as a PSG); cf. infra 
notes 228-230 and accompanying text (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s Skidmore defer-
ence to non-precedential BIA decisions). 
 209. See, e.g., Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 666 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 210. See id. 
 211. Id. (quoting Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
 212. See supra Part I.C.2. 
STERNBERG_CHRISTENSEN 3/9/2012  9:06 PM 
2011] DO I NEED TO PIN A TARGET TO MY BACK? 277 
its two-alternatives approach to define PSG.213  Perdomo held that 
the BIA erred in concluding that women in Guatemala could not be a 
cognizable PSG.214  The Court began its analysis of PSG by noting 
that “[t]he BIA has not yet specifically addressed in a precedential 
decision whether gender by itself could form the basis of a particular 
social group.”215  After mentioning the BIA’s precedential decision in 
Kasinga, holding that women in a particular tribe who oppose FGM 
constitute a PSG,216 the court explained that “[w]hether females in a 
particular country, without any other defining characteristics, could 
constitute a protected social group remains an unresolved question 
for the BIA.”217  Then the court reviewed the development of its own 
two-alternatives test and case law on gender.218  Finally, the court re-
manded the case back to the BIA to determine whether women in 
Guatemala were a cognizable PSG “[b]ecause the BIA failed to apply 
both prongs of the Hernandez-Montiel definition to Perdomo’s claim 
that women in Guatemala constitute a particular social group and be-
cause the BIA’s decision is inconsistent with its own opinions in 
Acosta and  
C-A-.”219  Given that gender-based claims have been largely unsuc-
cessful in the past,220 this Ninth Circuit decision was truly one of a few 
“broad-based, dramatic decisions in the past year.”221 
In two recent cases, the Ninth Circuit gave Chevron deference to 
the BIA’s precedential decision about a similar PSG.222  In S-E-G-, 
the BIA firmly established as precedent that Salvadoran youths re-
sisting gang membership do not constitute a PSG.223  The Ninth Cir-
 
 213. See 611 F.3d at 669. 
 214. See id. 
 215. Id. at 666. 
 216. See id. (citing In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 366 (B.I.A. 1996)). 
 217. Id. 
 218. See id. 
 219. See id. at 669 (citations omitted). 
 220. See generally Siddiqui, supra note 37 (arguing that women should constitute a 
particular social group given the challenges that women asylum seekers face). 
 221. Gerald Seipp, A Year in Review: Social Visibility Doctrine Still Alive, but 
Questioned, 87 No. 27 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1417, 1417 (2010). 
 222. See Ramos Barrios v. Holder, 581 F.3d 849, 855 (9th Cir. 2009) (asserting that 
Chevron deference be given to the BIA’s analysis of the purported PSG of Guatema-
lan youths who refuse to join gangs); Ramos-Lopez v. Holder, 563 F.3d 855, 856 (9th 
Cir. 2009) (holding that Chevron deference is due to the BIA’s interpretation of the 
alleged PSG of Salvadoran youths who refuse to join gangs). 
 223. See In re S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 582-83 (B.I.A. 2008) (rejecting PSG of 
“Salavadoran youths who have resisted gang recruitment” for lack of social visibility 
and particularity). 
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cuit explained that the BIA expected the reasoning of S-E-G- to ap-
ply to other gangs in different countries.224  As a result, the Ninth Cir-
cuit gave Chevron deference to the BIA’s approach in S-E-G- in two 
cases dealing with youths who resist gang membership, Ramos Bar-
rios and Ramos-Lopez.225  In these two cases, the court affirmed the 
BIA’s analysis of PSG based on social visibility and particularity, in-
stead of applying the Ninth Circuit’s own two-alternatives test.226  The 
Ninth Circuit’s use of Chevron deference depends on the putative 
PSG in a given case.227 
The Ninth Circuit’s deference to the BIA has an additional layer of 
complexity.  An en banc Ninth Circuit case from March 2009 clarified 
that the analysis of PSG should proceed under Chevron if the BIA 
has already made a precedential ruling on a similar PSG.228  This clar-
ification further explains that Chevron deference is due to the BIA’s 
interpretation of the term’s definition in precedential cases, while 
Skidmore deference is due to the BIA’s interpretation in non-
precedential decisions.229  Following this methodology, the Ninth Cir-
 
 224. See Ramos Barrios, 581 F.3d at 855 n.4 (noting that “[t]he BIA’s reasoning in 
Matter of S-E-G- is no less applicable to the Mara 13 (or an equivalent gang) in Gua-
temala [than in El Salvador]”); Ramos-Lopez, 563 F.3d at 860. 
 225. See Ramos Barrios, 581 F.3d at 856, 858-60 (asserting that Chevron deference 
be given to the BIA’s analysis of the purported PSG of Guatemalan youths who re-
fuse to join gangs); Ramos-Lopez, 563 F.3d at 860 (holding that Chevron deference is 
due to the BIA’s interpretation of the alleged PSG of Salvadoran youths who refuse 
to join gangs). 
 226. See Ramos Barrios, 581 F.3d at 855 (noting that the PSG in Ramos-Lopez was 
rejected for lack of social visibility and particularity, reasoning that the argument for 
PSG here is “indistinguishable from the argument made in Ramos-Lopez,” and thus 
rejecting the PSG); Ramos-Lopez, 563 F.3d at 862 (holding that “it was reasonable 
for the BIA to conclude that the group was not sufficiently particular . . . [and] that 
the groups lacked social visibility”). 
 227. See supra notes 207-209, 222-226 and accompanying text. 
 228. See Ramos-Lopez, 563 F.3d at 858, 860 n.4 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 
558 F.3d 903, 908-12 (9th Cir. 2009); Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738 (9th Cir. 
2008)) (noting that the Ninth Circuit’s March 2009 en banc decision in Marmolejo-
Campos “clarified the method by which we determine the degree of deference owed 
to BIA decisions” and holding that “the BIA’s determination, in a published disposi-
tion, that a group is or is not a ‘particular social group’” was due Chevron deference).  
 229. See Marmolejo-Campos, 558 F.3d at 909-11 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted) (citations omitted) (noting that “[u]nder Skidmore, the measure of deference 
afforded to the agency varies depend[ing] upon the thoroughness evident in its con-
sideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pro-
nouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power 
to control” and that the Ninth Circuit accords Chevron deference to precedential 
BIA decisions and Skidmore deference to nonprecedential BIA decisions); see also 
Ramos-Lopez, 563 F.3d at 860 n.4 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omit-
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cuit gave Skidmore deference to a non-precedential BIA decision in a 
recent case.230  The analysis in this section focuses on Ninth Circuit 
cases that come after this analytical clarification.231 
D. Justifications and Criticisms of the Different Approaches to 
Defining Particular Social Group 
The approaches of the circuit courts that follow the BIA, the dis-
senting circuits, and the Ninth Circuit each have strengths and weak-
nesses.232  This Section explores the justifications and criticisms of 
each approach through several lenses, including Chevron defer-
ence,233 social visibility,234 and the Ninth Circuit’s two-alternatives 
test.235 
 
ted) (“We first had occasion to consider the BIA’s decision in In re S-E-G- in Santos-
Lemus v. Mukasey.  We did not analyze the BIA’s decision under the Chevron 
framework, noting instead that the BIA’s decision was not binding on us.  We decid-
ed Santos-Lemus, however, before our en banc decision in Marmolejo-Campos, in 
which we clarified the method by which we determine the degree of deference owed 
to BIA decisions.  Thus, to the extent Santos-Lemus is inconsistent with Marmolejo-
Campos, the later en banc decision must control.”).  The BIA’s precedential deci-
sions are published while the BIA’s nonprecedential decisions are unpublished. See 
Marmolejo-Campos, 558 F.3d at 908-12. 
 230. See Soriano v. Holder, 569 F.3d 1162, 1164 n.1 (9th Cir. 2009) (citations omit-
ted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“When, as here, the BIA’s decision is an 
unpublished decision by one member of the BIA, we give Skidmore deference to the 
BIA’s interpretation of the governing statutes and regulations, recognizing that, 
while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, [these interpreta-
tions] do constitute a body of experience.”)  Soriano further explained that some 
analysis of the alleged PSG beyond Chevron deference was necessary because the 
BIA had ruled in a precedential decision on “noncriminal drug informants working 
against the Cali drug cartel who act out of a sense of civic duty and moral responsibil-
ity,” Id. at 1165, which was distinguishable from the group at hand of “criminal gov-
ernment informant[s] who neither act[] from altruistic motives nor turn[] in partici-
pants in a drug cartel,” and subsequently finding that the group does not constitute a 
PSG for lack of innate characteristics under the two-alternatives test.  Id. 
 231. Id. 
 232. See supra Part II.A (characterizing the approach of the circuit courts that fol-
low the BIA by the use of immutable characteristics, social visibility, and particulari-
ty); supra Part II.B (explaining that the Third and Seventh Circuits use the immuta-
ble characteristics test and reject both social visibility and particularity); supra Part 
II.C (showing that the Ninth Circuit’s approach entails the two-alternatives test, 
comprised of innate characteristics or voluntary association, or the application of 
Chevron deference).  
 233. See supra notes 76-88 and accompanying text.  
 234. See supra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.  
 235. See supra Part I.C.2.  
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1. The Application of Chevron Deference 
Chevron deference plays a crucial role in all three approaches to 
defining PSG.  The circuit courts following the BIA justify their adop-
tion of the BIA’s approach to defining PSG with the Chevron doc-
trine.236  Chevron deference plays an important role here because, ac-
cording to the Supreme Court, “judicial deference to the Executive 
Branch is especially appropriate in the immigration context”237 and in 
the context of defining PSG.238  Given that PSG is not defined in the 
INA,239 circuit courts must decide whether the immigration agency’s 
interpretation of PSG is a permissible construction of the INA.240  
When these circuit courts find that the BIA’s construction of the stat-
ute is reasonable, they give Chevron deference to the BIA’s interpre-
tation of PSG in the INA.241  Generally, the circuit courts following 
 
 236. See Rivera-Barrientos v. Holder, 658 F.3d 1222, 1226-27 (citations omitted) 
(10th Cir. 2011); Bermudez-Botero v. Holder, 375 F. App’x 314, 316 (4th Cir. 2010) 
(quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 
(1984)); Al-Ghorbani v. Holder, 585 F.3d 980, 991 (6th Cir. 2009); Galindo-Torres v. 
Att’y Gen., 348 F. App’x 814, 817 (3d Cir. 2009); Scatambuli v. Holder, 558 F.3d 53, 
58 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting Elien v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 392, 397 (1st Cir. 2004)); Davi-
la-Mejia v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 624, 627 (8th Cir. 2008); Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 
F.3d 70, 72 (2d Cir. 2007); Castillo-Arias v. Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 1190, 1195 (11th Cir. 
2006). 
 237. INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999) (citing INS v. Abudu, 485 
U.S. 94, 110 (1988)). 
 238. See Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183, 186-87 (2006) (requiring the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals to remand the case to the BIA for consideration of the alien’s 
eligibility for asylum based on membership in the PSG of a particular family, rather 
than considering de novo the question of whether the particular family constituted a 
PSG where the BIA had not yet considered this PSG); Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 
611, 615 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Gonzales, 547 U.S. 183) (distinguishing deference for 
the BIA’s social visibility test from the BIA’s determination of whether a particular 
family constitutes a PSG in Gonzales by noting that “[w]e are mindful of the Su-
preme Court’s admonition to the courts of appeals . . . that the Board’s definition of 
‘particular social group’ is entitled to deference.  The issue in that case was whether a 
family could be a particular social group, a difficult issue on which the Board had not 
opined; and the Court held that the Board should have an opportunity to do so.  But 
regarding ‘social visibility’ as a criterion for determining ‘particular social group,’ the 
Board has been inconsistent rather than silent”).  See generally Supreme Court Finds 
“Membership in Particular Social Group” Must First Be Determined by Agency Not 
Court, 83 No. 17 INTERPRETER RELEASES 769 (2006) (providing a history and over-
view of Gonzales). 
 239. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 240. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-
43 (1984); see also supra notes 76-88 and accompanying text. 
 241. See Bermudez-Botero, 375 F. App’x at 316 (noting that “this court will defer 
to the Board’s ‘reasonable interpretation’ of the term” (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 
843-44)); Al-Ghorbani, 585 F.3d at 991 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (noting that “substantial deference is given to the BIA’s interpretation of 
STERNBERG_CHRISTENSEN 3/9/2012  9:06 PM 
2011] DO I NEED TO PIN A TARGET TO MY BACK? 281 
the BIA apply Chevron deference to the BIA’s interpretation of 
PSG, and consequently determine that immutable characteristics, so-
cial visibility, and particularity constitute a permissible statutory con-
struction of PSG.242 
To illustrate, the Eleventh Circuit applies Chevron deference to 
the definition of PSG in the following way.  The Eleventh Circuit ex-
plains the meaning of permissible statutory construction by specifying 
that “[a]n agency’s interpretation is deemed reasonable unless it is 
‘arbitrary, capricious, or clearly contrary to law.’”243  In Castillo-
Arias, the Eleventh Circuit framed the analysis by declaring, “we 
must follow the BIA’s determination that noncriminal informants 
working against the Cali cartel are not a social group under the INA 
unless the interpretation is unreasonable, i.e., arbitrary, capricious, or 
clearly contrary to law.”244  Then, the court determined that the BIA’s 
tests used to define PSG and their application to the facts were rea-
sonable.245  Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit and the other circuits 
that follow the BIA justify their recent adoption of the social visibility 
and particularity tests (in addition to the older immutable characteris-
tics test) using Chevron.246 
In contrast, the dissenting circuits do not apply Chevron deference 
to the BIA’s construction of PSG.247  By way of rejecting the ap-
 
the INA” and that “[t]he BIA’s interpretation of the statute and regulations will be 
upheld unless the interpretation is arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the 
statute”); Galindo-Torres, 348 F. App’x at 817 (citations omitted) (explaining that 
because of the ambiguity of the statutory phrase “particular social group,” the court 
has generally given deference to the BIA’s interpretation); Scatambuli, 558 F.3d at 58 
(quoting Elien, 364 F.3d at 397) (asserting that “[w]hen a statute is silent or ambigu-
ous, therefore, we uphold the implementing agency’s statutory interpretation, pro-
vided it is ‘reasonable’ and consistent with the statute”); Davila-Mejia, 531 F.3d at 
627 (noting that the court accords “substantial deference to the BIA’s interpretation 
of the statutes . . . it administers”); Ucelo-Gomez, 509 F.3d at 72 (analyzing whether 
the “BIA’s construction [of social group] was a reasonable interpretation of the stat-
ute”); Castillo-Arias, 446 F.3d at 1195-96 (citations omitted) (discussing the applica-
tion of Chevron deference to the BIA’s interpretation of PSG “unless the interpreta-
tion is unreasonable, i.e., arbitrary, capricious, or clearly contrary to the law”). 
 242. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43; supra notes 76-88 and accompanying text; 
supra note 236. 
 243. Castillo-Arias, 446 F.3d at 1195 (citing Alabama Power Co. v. Fed. Energy 
Regulatory Comm’n, 22 F.3d 270, 272 (11th Cir. 1994)); cf. supra Part II.C. (discuss-
ing the Ninth Circuit’s application of Chevron based on whether the BIA has already 
ruled on a very similar group to the alleged PSG in the case at hand). 
 244. Castillo-Arias, 446 F.3d at 1196. 
 245. See id. at 1196-99. 
 246. See supra note 236. 
 247. See supra notes 193-194, 206 and accompanying text. 
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proach of the BIA (that the majority of circuits follow), the Seventh 
Circuit’s Gatimi v. Holder stated that Chevron should not apply be-
cause of the inconsistent use of social visibility in past BIA deci-
sions.248  Referring to this inconsistency, Judge Posner, in Gatimi, ex-
plains that the BIA “has found groups to be ‘particular social groups’ 
without reference to social visibility, as well as, in this and other cases, 
refusing to classify socially invisible groups as particular social groups 
but without repudiating the other line of cases.”249  Furthermore, 
“[w]hen an administrative agency’s decisions are inconsistent, a court 
cannot pick one of the inconsistent lines and defer to that one,” and 
“[s]uch picking and choosing would condone arbitrariness and usurp 
the agency’s responsibilities.”250  As a result, the Seventh Circuit did 
not adhere to the BIA’s definition of PSG because Chevron defer-
ence does not apply where the BIA’s prior rulings are inconsistent.251  
For similar reasons, the Third Circuit also rejected the BIA’s ap-
proach after concluding that it was not entitled to Chevron defer-
ence.252  
As the discussion above highlights, the finding that Chevron ap-
plies or does not apply to the definition of PSG is critical.  The de-
termination that Chevron deference is due to the BIA’s definition of 
PSG leads courts to follow the BIA’s approach by adopting immuta-
ble characteristics, social visibility, and particularity.253 On the other 
hand, the determination not to give Chevron deference to the BIA 
can lead a court, such as the Seventh Circuit here, to reject the social 
visibility and particularity components of the BIA’s definition of 
PSG.254  If Chevron deference applies, then Chevron serves as a justi-
fication for the approach of the deferential circuit courts that follow 
the BIA,255 and as a criticism of the allegedly non-deferential dissent-
 
 248. See Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615-16 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Gonzales v. 
Thomas, 547 U.S. 183 (2006)) (discussing whether a family could be a PSG). 
 249. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 250. Id. at 616 (internal citations omitted). 
 251. See Harris & Weibel, supra note 40, at 12 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(claiming that “[u]nlike Matter of C-A-, where social visibility was treated as a rele-
vant factor, in S-E-G-, the BIA concluded that the proposed social group fails the so-
cial visibility test.  This lack of clarity on whether social visibility is a factor or a re-
quirement indicates a lack of consistency, so under Chevron, Circuit courts should 
not afford the BIA deference in this inconsistent approach.”); supra notes 193-194 
and accompanying text. 
 252. See supra note 206 and accompanying text. 
 253. See supra notes 242, 246 and accompanying text. 
 254. See supra note 251 and accompanying text. 
 255. See supra notes 236-242 and accompanying text. 
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ing circuits’ approach.256  If Chevron deference does not apply, then 
lack of deference justifies the dissenting circuits’ approach,257 and 
serves as a basis for criticizing the deferential circuit courts following 
the BIA.258  
Finally, the Ninth Circuit applies Chevron deference in a different 
way. The Ninth Circuit gives Chevron deference to the BIA’s prece-
dential decisions about very similar groups, and uses the BIA’s ap-
proach to defining PSG in these instances.259  Otherwise, the Ninth 
Circuit applies its two-alternatives test.260  This use of Chevron defer-
ence depends on the purported PSG in the case at hand.261  For ex-
ample, the Ninth Circuit rationalizes following BIA decisions about 
groups resisting gangs by relying on the doctrine of Chevron defer-
ence.262  The Ninth Circuit’s application of Chevron differs from that 
of the circuit courts that follow the BIA and the dissenting circuits, 
which respectively give and refuse to give Chevron deference to the 
BIA’s definition of PSG, regardless of the facts of the case.263  If the 
Ninth Circuit’s fact-specific application of Chevron is appropriate, 
then this serves as both a justification for the Ninth Circuit’s approach 
and as a criticism of the other two approaches.264  If the fact-specific 
application is improper, however, this serves as a criticism of the 
Ninth Circuit’s approach.265 
 
 256. See, e.g., Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000), over-
ruled on other grounds by Thomas v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2005), vacat-
ed, Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183 (2006).  For a similar argument criticizing an-
other circuit court’s lack of deference to the BIA under the Chevron doctrine, see 
James H. Martin, Note, The Ninth Circuit’s Review of Administrative Questions of 
Law in the Immigration Context: How the Court in Hernandez-Montiel v. INS Ig-
nored Chevron and Failed to Bring Harmony to “Particular Social Group” Analysis, 
10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 159, 172-82 (2001). 
 257. See supra notes 193-194, 206, 247-252 and accompanying text. 
 258. See supra note 251 and accompanying text. 
 259. See supra note 208. 
 260. See, e.g., Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 666 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 261. See supra notes 207-209, 222-226 and accompanying text. 
 262. See Ramos Barrios v. Holder, 581 F.3d 849, 855 (9th Cir. 2009) (asserting that 
Chevron deference should be granted to the BIA’s analysis of the purported PSG of 
Guatemalan youths who refuse to join gangs); Ramos-Lopez v. Holder, 563 F.3d 855, 
856 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. 837) (holding that Chevron deference is 
due to the BIA’s interpretation of the alleged PSG of Salvadoran youths who refuse 
to join gangs); see also supra notes 76-88 and accompanying text. 
 263. Compare supra notes 259-262 and accompanying text, with supra notes 236-
242 and accompanying text, and supra notes 247-252 and accompanying text. 
 264. See supra note 263. 
 265. See supra note 263. 
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2. Social Visibility: Strengths and Weaknesses 
In addition to Chevron, an examination of the strengths and weak-
nesses of the social visibility test sheds light on the overall justifica-
tions and criticisms of the three different approaches to defining PSG.  
Some commentators praise the addition of social visibility to the 
analysis of social group. For example, a commentator noted that add-
ing social visibility to the analysis of PSG “appears to be on more sol-
id ground,” and can find support both in Second Circuit precedent 
and the UNHCR Guidelines.266  Commentators also praise the social 
perception approach, which serves as the foundation for the social 
visibility test,267 by highlighting the adaptability of the approach to 
changing and developing social contexts.268 Other strengths of social 
perception include “the fluidity of [the] approach [which] is a prag-
matic recognition of the absence of a completely settled and authori-
tative set of external standards of reference,” and that “the scope of 
judicial discretion is greater than under the ejusdem generis ap-
proach, thus enabling judges to take account of the political and cul-
tural specificity of circumstances in the applicant’s country of 
origin.”269 
Other commentators, however, have voiced criticism of the social 
visibility test.270  First, the social visibility test would change the re-
sults in some well-respected, older cases.271  The use of social visibility 
might jeopardize important precedent and thus harm the ability of 
 
 266. See, e.g., Martin, Major Developments in Asylum Law over the Past Year, 
supra note 151 (referencing the UNHCR Guidelines and Second Circuit precedent as 
support for the assertion that the addition of social visibility to the analysis of social 
group “appears to be on more solid ground”).  For an argument that social visibility 
does not really draw support from the UNHCR Guidelines, see supra notes 153-60 
and accompanying text. 
 267. See supra notes 153-60 and accompanying text. 
 268. See Aleinikoff, supra note 34, at 299-300. 
 269. See Hathaway & Foster, supra note 30, at 484. 
 270. See infra notes 271-284 and accompanying text.  For an argument that social 
visibility needs clarification, see Melissa J. Hernandez Pimentel, Note, The Invisible 
Refugee: Examining the Board of Immigration Appeals’ “Social Visibility” Doctrine, 
76 MO. L. REV. 575, 597 (2011) (“The continuing discrepancies of the social visibility 
doctrine will only lead to a greater divide until the BIA clarifies the social visibility 
doctrine or until the Supreme Court ultimately decides the doctrine’s fate.”). 
 271. See, e.g., Marouf, supra note 47, at 65 (citing In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 
957 (B.I.A. 2006), aff’d sub nom. Castillo-Arias v. Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 1190 (11th 
Cir. 2006); In re Fauziya Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365-66 (B.I.A. 1996)) (arguing 
that Kasinga and other BIA decisions that preceded In re C-A- and the social visibil-
ity test would come out differently under the new BIA approach adopting social visi-
bility as a criterion for social group). 
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asylum applicants to obtain asylum on the ground of a PSG based on 
opposition to FGM,272 a PSG of Cuban homosexuals,273 and a PSG 
based on the past experience of working as Salvadoran policemen.274  
While the BIA claimed that it had been using social visibility all 
along,275 the facts in these cases suggest that these PSGs would have 
failed under the social visibility test.276  Other commentators note that 
the fate of many claims involving gender and sexual orientation might 
be negatively impacted by the social visibility test.277 
Second, the social visibility test is difficult to apply.  One commen-
tator explains that “the ‘social visibility’ test will be inherently diffi-
cult to apply.278  Because this approach seems mostly subjective and 
sociological in nature, not based on legal norms and principles like 
the ‘protected characteristic’ approach, it poses unique evidentiary 
challenges and likely will result in inconsistent and incoherent deci-
 
 272. See Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 365 (holding that young Togolese women who 
have not had FGM and who oppose the practice constitute a PSG); see also Deborah 
E. Anker, Boundaries in the Field of Human Rights: Refugee Law, Gender, and the 
Human Rights Paradigm, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 133, 146 (2002) (citing Kasinga, 21 I. 
& N. Dec. 357) (discussing Kasinga and then concluding that “because of the cultural 
relativist conundrum, the continued failure to take women’s rights seriously and the 
complexity of the state responsibility question, gender asylum law is one of the few 
areas where the question of FGS [“female genital surgery”] as a human rights viola-
tion is confronted”). 
 273. See In re Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819, 820-23 (B.I.A. 1990) (holding 
that homosexuals known to the Cuban government constitute a PSG). 
 274. Cf. In re Fuentes, 19 I. & N. Dec. 658, 662 (B.I.A. 1988) (recognizing that 
former Salvadoran policemen might constitute a PSG in subsequent cases). 
 275. See In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 960. 
 276. See Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 2009); Marouf, supra note 
47, at 64-65 (noting that “[t]he BIA’s decision in Kasinga, for example, contains no 
information indicating that young women who oppose female genital cutting are pub-
licly vocal about their opinion, or that anyone outside their families has reason to 
know whether or not they have undergone the practice” and that “the UNHCR 
points out that  ‘the general population of Cuba would not recognize homosexuals 
[regarding Toboso-Alfonso], nor would average Salvadorans necessarily recognize 
former members of the national police [referring to Fuentes], nor would a typical To-
golese tribal member inevitably be aware of women who opposed female genital mu-
tilation but had not been subjected to the practice’ [referring to Kasinga]”); Brief for 
U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees as Amicus Curiae Supporting Claimants at 8, 
Thomas, No. A75-597-0331-034/-035/-036 (B.I.A. Dec. 27, 2007); see also Danielle 
L.C. Beach, 09-12 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1 (Dec. 2009). 
 277. See Harris & Weibel, supra note 40, at 23-25 (citations omitted) (discussing 
the negative impact that social visibility will likely have on claims by women who op-
pose and suffer domestic violence because domestic violence often occurs in private; 
noting the negative impact that social visibility is likely to have on claims based on 
sexual orientation because social stigma often leads asylum applicants to hide their 
sexual orientation in their country of origin). 
 278. See Marouf, supra note 47, at 71-78. 
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sions.”279  The way the BIA explains the social visibility test leaves 
many questions unanswered, such as whether the test focuses on ac-
tual visibility “in the literal sense or in the ‘external criterion’ sense”, 
which would subject a group without a literally visible characteristic 
to different treatment, “or even[ ]whether it understands the differ-
ence.”280  This lack of clarity on how to apply social visibility and what 
the test means contributes to inconsistent results.281  Additionally, so-
cial visibility arguably leads to the strange outcome where a group 
that tries to remain unnoticed to avoid persecution cannot obtain asy-
lum based on PSG.282  As discussed earlier, the BIA’s interpretation 
of social visibility substantially differs from the UNHCR’s Guidelines, 
even though the BIA’s adoption of the social visibility test purported 
to rely on these Guidelines.283  Finally, “[b]ecause social visibility is 
often not a black or white issue, making it a requirement for a valid 
social group will lead to inconsistent and unreliable results.”284 
3. The Ninth Circuit’s Innate Characteristics or Voluntary 
Association Test 
In addition to Chevron and social visibility, it is important to exam-
ine the Ninth Circuit’s two-alternatives test before evaluating the dif-
ferent approaches in Part III.  The Ninth Circuit justifies its two-
alternatives test, which requires either innate characteristics or volun-
tary association, by relying on Ninth Circuit precedent, which in turn 
partially relies on Acosta.285  Additionally, the two-alternatives test 
“embraces individuals who are actually persecuted—even if they fail 
to qualify for asylum under the statute’s other enumerated catego-
ries,” and provides “a mechanism that meets the needs of those who 
do not fit neatly into a particular racial or religious group.”286 Finally, 
 
 279. Id. at 71.  The criticisms of the BIA’s C-A- decision also apply as a justifica-
tion of the Seventh Circuit’s approach.  See supra notes 152-162 and accompanying 
text. 
 280. Benitez Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426, 430 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 281. See Bresnahan, supra notes 48, at 670-71. 
 282. See supra notes 196-197 and accompanying text. 
 283. See In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 961 (B.I.A. 2006), aff’d sub nom. Castillo-
Arias, 446 F.3d 1190 (11th Cir. 2006); Marouf, supra note 47, at 49 (citing In re A-M-
E-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69 (B.I.A. 2007), aff’d sub nom. Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 
F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 2007)). 
 284. Harris & Weibel, supra note 40, at 25 (citations omitted). 
 285. See supra Part I.C.2. 
 286. Immigration Law—Asylum—Ninth Circuit Holds That Persecuted Homo-
sexual Mexican Man with a Female Sexual Identity Qualifies for Asylum under Par-
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the two-alternatives test comports with congressional intent in adopt-
ing the Refugee Act of 1980, and with international obligations under 
the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol.287 
Courts and commentators have also criticized the two-alternatives 
test.  The voluntary association part of the two-alternatives test has 
been “widely criticized,” and even “[t]he Ninth Circuit . . . seems to 
have recognized the weakness” of the approach.288  Discussing the 
voluntary association test, one critic claims that “[t]o the extent that 
Sanchez-Trujillo presents an inconsistent and unclear framework—
emphasizing ‘voluntary associational relationship’ and then providing 
the family as a ‘protyp[e]’—its test should probably be disregarded 
and subsumed within the Board’s approach [following the immutable 
characteristics test], which has been endorsed by commentators and 
other courts.”289  In addition, the application of the two-alternatives 
test in Perdomo can be criticized as defying the very meaning of “par-
ticular” by defining Guatemalan women, which make up half of a 
country, as a PSG.290  Finally, commentators criticize the Ninth Cir-
cuit for “finding S-E-G- dispositive on the factual issue” of whether 
the purported PSG is socially visible in several cases, including Ra-
mos-Lopez and Ramos Barrios.291  These commentators explain that 
“[s]ocial visibility determinations must be based on the facts and con-
text of a particular country,”292 and that an older Ninth Circuit case 
mandates that cases be determined based on the facts of the individu-
al’s case, not on the cases of others.293  As this Part demonstrated, 
 
ticular Social Group Standard—Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 
2000), 114 HARV. L. REV. 2569, 2573 (2001). 
 287. See id. 
 288. See Aleinikoff, supra note 34, at 277, 278 (citations omitted) (noting the “sig-
nificant tension” between the voluntary association test and the immutable character-
istics test, as demonstrated by the fact that the distinct group of homosexuals, for ex-
ample, has immutable characteristics but is unlikely to satisfy the voluntary 
association test); accord DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED 
STATES 382 (3d ed. 1999) (citations omitted) (noting “the criticism leveled against 
Sanchez-Trujillo”); see also Hathaway & Foster, supra note 30, at 478 (asserting that 
there is a consensus that voluntary association is not required for a cognizable PSG). 
 289. ANKER, supra note 288, at 382 (citations omitted). 
 290. See Doyle, supra note 119, at 548 (arguing that “defining a group of people 
who comprise about half of society (females who live as women) as a ‘particular so-
cial group’ would seem to defy the addition of the modified ‘particular’” and that us-
ing gender as a PSG is “illogical”). 
 291. See Harris & Weibel, supra note 40, at 16-17 & n.99. 
 292. Id. at 16. 
 293. See id. at 17 (citations omitted) (finding that an individual is “entitled to a de-
termination” based on the factual circumstance of his own case, “not [that] of others” 
(quoting Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d 102, 105 (9th Cir. 1969))). 
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there is a conflict between the circuit courts that follow the BIA, the 
dissenting circuits, and the Ninth Circuit about the meaning of PSG.  
This conflict leads to disparate outcomes in asylum cases depending 
on where the asylum proceedings take place. 
III.  RESOLUTION: THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S APPROACH 
After presenting the conflict regarding the definition of PSG 
among the circuit courts in Part II, Part III proposes the adoption of 
the Third and Seventh Circuits’ approach as a resolution to the con-
flict.  This Part begins by proposing that uniformity and consistency in 
the definition of PSG is a desirable goal, and that the Supreme Court 
should resolve the conflict by adopting a uniform definition of PSG.  
The dissenting circuits’ approach to defining PSG should be adopted 
for the following reasons: proper application of Chevron deference; 
relative ease of application; basis in coherent statutory analysis; con-
sistency with international obligations; and rejection of the social visi-
bility test and particularity requirement. 
A. Uniformity and Consistency of Law, and the Supreme Court 
An important argument in the debate about PSG is that the law 
should be uniform and consistent.294  Refugee Roulette, an article 
about the disparities in asylum outcomes, opened with the following 
statement about judicial consistency in the United States: 
We Americans love the idea of “equal justice under law,” the words 
inscribed above the main entrance to the Supreme Court building.  
We want like cases to come out alike.  We publish tens of thousands 
of judicial decisions and have enshrined the concept of stare decisis 
in order to reduce the likelihood that Jane’s case, adjudicated in De-
cember 2006, will come out very differently from Joe’s very similar 
case adjudicated in January 2007. . . . Americans don’t love con-
sistent decision making merely because we think that fairness to the 
parties requires that similar cases should have similar outcomes.  We 
also like the predictability that stare decisis offers.295 
Uniformity in the law is desirable because it prevents arbitrary out-
comes.296  In the context of PSG, “the complexity of U.S. social group 
jurisprudence” begs for “additional clarity.”297  Judge Posner made 
the following comment about the inconsistency of asylum law: 
 
 294. See Voss, supra note 40, at 252-53. 
 295. Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz & Schrag, supra note 40, at 299. 
 296. See Voss, supra note 40, at 252-53. 
 297. Harris & Weibel, supra note 40, at 28. 
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[G]iven the uncertainties in the law, the difficulties in the facts, [and] 
the seemingly arbitrary variance among the immigration judges, the 
court of appeals judges are also going to be falling back on . . . per-
sonal reactions, intuitions, values, and so on . . . .  This is supposed to 
be a uniform body of federal law. 298 
The goal of uniformity in the law is particularly important in this 
context because the absence of a clear, uniform definition of PSG has 
led to many failed asylum applications in the United States.299 
To help create uniformity in asylum law, the Supreme Court should 
resolve the conflict about the definition of PSG.  In light of the fact 
that the Court has never expressly decided the meaning of PSG,300 a 
recent Petition for Writ of Certiorari asked the Supreme Court to re-
solve the circuit split over the definition of PSG.301  Although the Su-
preme Court did not explain why the Petition was denied, the argu-
ments of the government might shed light on the denial.  The 
unpublished, brief case of Contreras-Martinez discusses a consistently 
unsuccessful type of PSG—youths who refuse to join gangs.302  Ac-
cording to the government, this case was not a good vehicle for re-
solving the circuit split on how to define PSG because there is sub-
stantial agreement that refusal to join gangs should not constitute a 
PSG.303  If the Court accepted the government’s narrow framing of 
the issue as whether youths who refuse to join gangs constitute a 
PSG,304 then the case would have been easy to dismiss.305  The denial 
 
 298. RAMI-NOGALES, PROPOSALS FOR REFORM, supra note 40, at 79. 
 299. See Heyman, Protecting Foreign Victims, supra note 40, at 120; Heyman, 
Challenge of Domestic Violence, supra note 121, at 771 (arguing specifically for a 
clearer definition of PSG and that “[u]nless consensus is reached on this issue [of the 
definition of PSG], asylum cannot address claims effectively based on social group 
membership”). 
 300. See Radtke, supra note 50, at 37. 
 301. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *10, Contreras-Martinez v. Holder, 346 
F. App’x 956 (4th Cir. 2009) (No. 09-830), 2010 WL 128010; Radtke, supra note 50, at 
37. 
 302. See Contreras-Martinez, 346 F. App’x 956, cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3274 
(2010); Brief for the Respondent in Opposition, supra note 50, at 8 (asserting that 
“no court of appeals has held that people who refuse to join a gang because they ob-
ject to the gang’s violent activities constitute a ‘particular social group’ under the 
INA”). 
 303. See Contreras-Martinez, 346 F. App’x 956; Brief for the Respondent in Oppo-
sition, supra note 50, at 8. 
 304. See Brief for the Respondent in Opposition, supra note 50, at 9; cf. Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 50, at 9-10.  But see Brief for the Respondent in 
Opposition, supra note 50, at 10 (arguing that even assuming that there is a split on 
the “permissible methodology for evaluating ‘particular social group’ claims,” the 
split is “lopsided and less well developed than petitioner suggests”). 
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of the Petition for Writ of Certiorari indicates that the case was not a 
good vehicle for resolving the conflict.306  The Supreme Court, there-
fore, should resolve the circuit split when a better case comes along. 
Alternatively, Congress could amend the INA to clarify the defini-
tion of PSG.307  In the 112th Congress, bills in both the House and the 
Senate propose to amend the definition of PSG.308  House Bill 2185, 
introduced by Democratic Representative Lofgren, and Senate Bill 
1202, introduced by Democratic Senator Leahy, both include the 
same definition of PSG.309  Both bills, entitled the Refugee Protection 
Act of 2011, suggest the following amendment to the INA: 
For purposes of determinations under this Act, any group whose 
members share a characteristic that is either immutable or funda-
mental to identity, conscience, or the exercise of the person’s human 
rights such that the person should not be required to change it, shall 
be deemed a particular social group, without any additional re-
quirement.310 
The bills are currently in Committee in both the House and Sen-
ate.311  Given the “daunting” challenge of passing immigration legisla-
 
 305. See Contreras-Martinez, 346 F. App’x 956; Brief for the Respondent in Oppo-
sition, supra note 50, at 8, (asserting that “no court of appeals has held that people 
who refuse to join a gang because they object to the gang’s violent activities consti-
tute a ‘particular social group’ under the INA”). 
 306. See supra notes 301-305 and accompanying text. 
 307. See Harris & Weibel, supra note 40, at 28 (claiming that “clarity could be 
achieved . . . by amending the Refugee Act of 1980 to include a definition for social 
group”). 
 308. See Refugee Protection Act of 2011, H.R. 2185, 112th Congress, § 5(a)(D) 
(2011); Refugee Protection Act of 2011, S. 1202, 112th Cong. § 5(a)(D) (2011).   
 309. See Refugee Protection Act of 2011, H.R. 2185, 112th Congress, § 5(a)(D) 
(2011).  The same day the Refugee Protection Act was introduced in the House, the 
Bill was introduced in the Senate, proposing the same language to define PSG. Refu-
gee Protection Act of 2011, S. 1202, 112th Cong. § 5(a)(D) (2011).  This language 
came from Senator Leahy’s Bill introduced the year before in the 111th Congress. 
See S. 3113, 111th Cong. § 5(a)(D) (2010).   
 310. See H.R. 2185, 112th Congress, § 5(a)(D) (2011); S. 1202, 112th Cong. § 
5(a)(D) (2011). 
 311. This House of Representatives Bill has eight co-sponsors. See H.R. 2185, 
112th Congress, § 5(a)(D) (2011); 157 Cong. Rec. H5150-02 (2011).  In August 2011, 
the House Bill was referred to the Subcommittee on Immigration Policy and En-
forcement. See Bill Summary & Status: 112th Congress (2011-2012) H.R. 2185, 
THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:h.r.2185: (last visited Sept. 12, 
2011).  Currently, the Senate Bill has three co-sponsors, and is in the Committee on 
the Judiciary. See Bill Summary & Status: 112th Congress (2011-2012) S. 2012, 
THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:SN01202: (last visited Sept. 
12, 2011). 
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tion in Congress,312 the Supreme Court’s resolution of the meaning of 
PSG would be more efficient and effective. 
B. Adopting the Third and Seventh Circuits’ Approach 
The Third and Seventh Circuits’ approach to defining PSG (the 
immutable characteristics test) should be adopted to resolve the cir-
cuit split.  The dissenting circuits’ approach properly applies Chevron, 
is easiest to apply, has a basis in coherent statutory analysis, comports 
with international obligations, and rejects the problematic social visi-
bility test and particularity requirement.  If given the opportunity to 
rule on the definition of PSG, the Supreme Court should adopt the 
approach of the Third and Seventh Circuits.313  In addition, the Fifth 
Circuit,314 which has not yet taken a definitive position on the issue of 
PSG, should adopt the approach of the dissenting circuits. 
Significantly, the dissenting circuits properly apply Chevron in the 
context of the BIA’s definition of PSG.  Judge Posner’s well-founded 
conclusion that the BIA’s prior rulings on PSG were inconsistent, es-
pecially with regard to the social visibility test, led to the decision not 
to afford Chevron deference to the BIA’s approach.315  Based on this 
determination, the dissenting circuits properly rejected the social visi-
bility test and particularity requirements.316  In contrast, the circuit 
courts that follow the BIA improperly applied Chevron deference to 
the BIA’s social visibility test and particularity requirement because 
they did not recognize that the BIA’s prior rulings on PSG were in-
consistent.317  The BIA’s prior inconsistent decisions also undermine 
the Ninth Circuit’s approach, which gives Chevron deference to prec-
edential BIA cases about similar groups.318 
 
 312. See WASEM, supra note 49, at 1 (noting that while “selected immigration is-
sues are likely to be a major concern for the 112th Congress, . . . legislative action on 
such contentious issues appears daunting”). 
 313. See supra Part II.B. 
 314. See, e.g., Bayavarpu v. Holder, 390 F. App’x 353, 353 (5th Cir. 2010) (discuss-
ing the BIA’s social visibility and particularity requirements favorably, but basing its 
holding only on the criterion that the PSG not be defined exclusively by persecution); 
Orellana-Monson v. Holder, 332 F. App’x 202, 203 (5th Cir. 2009) (rejecting PSG 
without explaining the rationale for this holding).  
 315. See supra notes 193-194, 247-251 and accompanying text.  Cf. supra notes 76-
88 (providing an overview of the Chevron doctrine). 
 316. See supra notes 193-194, 206, 247-252, 257-258 and accompanying text. 
 317. See supra note 258 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 236-242 and 
accompanying text. 
 318. See supra note 265 and accompanying text. 
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The dissenting circuits’ approach is also theoretically coherent.319  
The Third and Seventh Circuits reject the approach of C-A- and 
therefore avoid the questionable rationale of that decision.320  In re-
jecting social visibility and particularity, the dissenting circuits re-
turned to the immutable characteristics test, which had generally been 
the law for twenty years.321  The protected characteristics theory, 
which is built on Acosta’s foundations, is respected and rests upon 
strong theoretical underpinnings.322  Even assuming that the social 
perception theory is a more coherent theory than the protected char-
acteristics theory, the BIA misapplied the social perception theory in 
C-A.323  Therefore, even if the momentum of the social perception 
theory worldwide is acknowledged,324 the social visibility test signifi-
cantly diverges from the theoretical framework of social percep-
tion.325  Consequently, whatever merits the social perception theory 
may have, it cannot fully justify the social visibility test.326 
The dissenting circuits’ approach is also theoretically coherent be-
cause these circuits reject particularity.327  According to the BIA, 
“[t]he essence of the ‘particularity’ requirement . . . is whether the 
proposed group can accurately be described in a manner sufficiently 
distinct that the group would be recognized, in the society in question, 
 
 319. See infra notes 320-331 and accompanying text. 
 320. See In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled on other 
grounds by In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987); In re C-A-, 23 I. & 
N. Dec. 951, 957 (B.I.A. 2006), aff’d sub nom. Castillo-Arias v. Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 
1190 (11th Cir. 2006); Marouf, supra note 47, at 50 (citing In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 
951) (arguing that adjudicators “should not give deference to the BIA’s decisions in 
C-A- and . . . [another BIA decision] because they do not provide a permissible in-
terpretation of the Convention and represent a sudden, unexplained change in the 
way the BIA defines ‘membership of a particular social group’”); supra notes 191, 
195, 200, 271-276 and accompanying text. 
 321. See In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233; Harris & Weibel, supra note 40, at 23 
(expressing the hope that other circuit courts follow the Seventh Circuit’s rejection of 
social visibility and particularity and return to the original immutable characteristics 
test from Acosta). 
 322. See supra notes 99, 118–119, 155 and accompanying text (observing that the 
protected characteristics approach, which is incorporated in the UNHCR Guidelines, 
is endorsed by many jurists, scholars, and common law jurisdictions). 
 323. See supra notes 153-162 and accompanying text (explaining how the BIA’s 
social visibility test differs from the UNHCR’s social perception approach). 
 324. See Hathaway & Foster, supra note 30, at 482-83 (describing how the social 
perception approach has been adopted by the Australian courts, has influenced U.S. 
national guidelines, and is sometimes relied upon by other jurisdictions). 
 325. See supra notes 100, 153–162. 
 326. See supra notes 100, 153–162. 
 327. See supra notes 199, 203–206 and accompanying text. 
STERNBERG_CHRISTENSEN 3/9/2012  9:06 PM 
2011] DO I NEED TO PIN A TARGET TO MY BACK? 293 
as a discrete class of persons.”328  As this excerpt highlights, social vis-
ibility and particularity are not distinct tests.329  Emphasizing this 
blending of the two tests, the Third Circuit concluded that particulari-
ty merely articulates the same concept underlying social visibility, and 
ultimately rejected the particularity requirement.330  The inability to 
meaningfully distinguish particularity from social visibility illustrates 
that particularity is not a coherent legal test.331   
In terms of statutory construction, the dissenting circuits’ approach 
is the most advantageous.  The Acosta test, which the dissenting cir-
cuits follow, does the following: 
By basing the definition of “membership of a particular social 
group” on application of the ejusdem generis principle, we respect 
both the specific situation known to the drafters—concern for the 
plight of persons whose social origins put them at comparable risk to 
those in the other enumerated categories—and the more general 
commitment to grounding refugee claims in civil or political sta-
tus. . . .  Most important, the standard is sufficiently open-ended to 
allow for evolution in much the same way as has occurred with the 
four other grounds, but not so vague as to admit persons without a 
serious basis for claim to international protection.332 
As a result, the immutable characteristics test comports with the in-
tentions and the balance struck by the 1951 Convention.333  In addi-
tion, the immutable characteristics approach avoids the PSG as a 
“safety net” position,334 which makes the persecution requirement of 
asylum claims redundant.335  Acosta’s “middle ground position,” fol-
lowed by the dissenting circuits, also avoids making the other catego-
ries redundant.336 
 
 328. In re S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 584 (B.I.A. 2008). 
 329. See id. 
 330. See supra notes 203-204 and accompanying text. 
 331. See supra notes 203-204 and accompanying text. 
 332. See HATHAWAY, REFUGEE STATUS, supra note 34, at 161 (citations omitted). 
 333. See id.; Aleinikoff, supra note 34, at 285. 
 334. See HATHAWAY, REFUGEE STATUS, supra note 34, at 157-60 (citing Arthur C. 
Helton, Persecution on Account of Membership in a Social Group as a Basis for Ref-
ugee Status, 15 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 39 (1983)). 
 335. See HATHAWAY, REFUGEE STATUS, supra note 34, at 156-60; Aleinikoff, su-
pra note 34, at 285. 
 336. See HATHAWAY, REFUGEE STATUS, supra note 34, at 160 (citations omitted); 
Aleinikoff, supra note 34, at 285. 
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U.S. asylum law should comport with international obligations by 
providing humanitarian protection for refugees,337 and the dissenting 
circuits’ approach adheres to these international obligations.  The fol-
lowing highlights the relationship between PSG and the 1951 Conven-
tion: 
The analysis is guided by the underlying premise that a sensible in-
terpretation of the term [refugee] must be responsive to victims of 
persecution without so expanding the scope of the 1951 Convention 
as to impose upon States obligations to which they did not consent.  
In striking that delicate balance, it must be kept in mind that inter-
national refugee law bears a close relationship to international hu-
man rights law—that refugees are persons whose human rights have 
been violated and who merit international protection.338 
The United States has clearly indicated its intention to abide by in-
ternational refugee law obligations,339 and therefore should adopt the 
approach that best adheres to these obligations.  A definition of PSG, 
which discards social visibility and particularity, is better aligned with 
the United States’ international obligations based on the case law that 
the immutable characteristics test has generated in the past.340  By 
continuing the trajectory of cases that have developed claims based 
on gender and sexual orientation—claims which traditionally have 
had difficulty under asylum law—the United States would better 
comply with the obligations of international refugee law.341  The 
adoption of the dissenting circuits’ test would safeguard the develop-
ment of these valid and important asylum claims, and help ensure that 
U.S. asylum law continues to abide by international obligations.342 
The dissenting circuits’ approach is preferable to the approaches of 
both the Ninth Circuit and the circuits that follow the BIA.  Critiqu-
ing the other two approaches to defining PSG highlights the strengths 
of the dissenting circuits’ approach.  The Ninth Circuit’s approach is 
not ideal for several reasons.  First, both courts and commentators 
 
 337. See supra note 33; infra notes 338-339 and accompanying text; see also supra 
Part I.B. 
 338. Aleinikoff, supra note 34, at 265. 
 339. See supra Part I.B. and accompanying text. 
 340. See supra Part I.B.; supra notes 271-277 and accompanying text. 
 341. See Aleinikoff, supra note 34, at 309 (citations omitted); supra notes 271-277 
and accompanying text (claiming that the social visibility test threatens the future of 
cases based on gender and sexual orientation, which developed under the immutable 
characteristics test); see also supra Part I.B. 
 342. See Aleinikoff, supra note 34, at 309 (quoting R v. Sec’y of State for the 
Home Dep’t, Ex parte Shah, [1997] Imm. AR 145, 153 (A.C.)); supra notes 271-277 
and accompanying text; see also supra Part I.B. 
STERNBERG_CHRISTENSEN 3/9/2012  9:06 PM 
2011] DO I NEED TO PIN A TARGET TO MY BACK? 295 
criticize the voluntary association part of the Ninth Circuit’s two-
alternatives test as inconsistent and problematic.343  Second, the Ninth 
Circuit impermissibly uses the BIA’s S-E-G- decision as dispositive 
on the factual issue of social visibility in its own cases involving youths 
that refused to join gangs.344  This use was improper because determi-
nations about an applicant’s PSG should be based on the facts of the 
specific case, not on the outcome of an unrelated case.345  Finally, the 
overall complexity of the Ninth Circuit’s approach makes it less at-
tractive than the dissenting circuits’ simpler approach.346  In an area of 
law already plagued by inconsistency,347 the Ninth Circuit’s splintered 
approach, which may, depending on the facts, apply the voluntary as-
sociation or the innate characteristics test (and may give the BIA ei-
ther Chevron deference or Skidmore deference), is not the best route 
to a clear, uniform body of asylum law.348 
Criticism of the social visibility test, utilized by the circuits that fol-
low the BIA, also highlights the reasons the dissenting circuits’ ap-
proach is preferable.  The social visibility test leads to a strange result: 
a group that tries to remain invisible to avoid persecution cannot ob-
tain asylum based on PSG.349  Another criticism of this approach is 
that well-respected cases that crucially developed asylum law based 
on gender and sexual orientation would have had different outcomes 
under social visibility, even though the BIA claims that it was using 
the social visibility test all along.350  In addition, the social visibility 
test is more difficult to apply than the immutable characteristics 
test.351  The immutable characteristics test’s twenty years of precedent 
makes it easier to apply than the social visibility test, which has only 
been used for a few years.352  Additionally, the BIA’s opaque expla-
 
 343. See supra notes 288-290 and accompanying text. 
 344. See supra notes 291-293 and accompanying text. 
 345. See Harris & Weibel, supra note 40, at 17 (citations omitted) (finding that an 
individual is “entitled to a determination” based on the factual circumstance of his 
own case, “not [that] of others” (quoting Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d 102, 105 (9th Cir. 
1969))). 
 346. Compare supra Part II.C, with supra Part II.B. 
 347. See supra notes 297-299 and accompanying text. 
 348. See supra Part II.C. 
 349. See supra notes 196-197, 282 and accompanying text. 
 350. See supra notes 271-277 and accompanying text. 
 351. See supra notes 278-279 and accompanying text. 
 352. See In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled on other 
grounds by In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987); In re C-A-, 23 I. & 
N. Dec. 951, 957 (B.I.A. 2006), aff’d sub nom. Castillo-Arias v. Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 
1190 (11th Cir. 2006). 
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nation and application of social visibility has not only contributed to 
inconsistent results in the past,353 but will likely lead to future incon-
sistency and arbitrariness.354 
After reviewing the criticisms of the circuits that follow the BIA 
and the Ninth Circuit, certain concerns about the dissenting circuits’ 
approach should be considered.  The main concerns about the Sev-
enth Circuit’s approach are its lack of Chevron deference, which has 
been addressed above,355 and worries about opening the floodgates.356  
Concerns about the dissenting circuits’ definition of PSG opening the 
floodgates of refugees are not well-founded.357  The floodgates argu-
ment has been raised at numerous points in American history and has 
proved to be an unsubstantiated argument.358  For example, when 
Kasinga held that a group that opposed FGM was a PSG, the con-
cerns about a floodgates problem did not materialize.359  When Cana-
da greatly expanded its grounds for asylum, the country did not expe-
rience a “flood” of new asylum seekers.360  Specifically, the addition 
of gender as an enumerated ground for asylum in Canada only in-
creased asylum applications by two percent.361  Finally, concerns 
about floodgates should be alleviated by the fact that applicants still 
need to establish the other elements of an asylum claim.362  In sum, 
the Third and Seventh Circuits’ approach has many advantages over 
the approaches of the other circuit courts.363 
 
 353. See Benitez Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426, 430 (7th Cir. 2009); Bresnahan, 
supra note 48, at 670-71. 
 354. See supra notes 279, 284 and accompanying text. 
 355. See supra notes 315–316 and accompanying text. 
 356. See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text. 
 357. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text. 
 358. See, e.g., In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (B.I.A. 1996); Cianciarulo & Da-
vid, supra note 37, at 381. 
 359. See Cianciarulo & David, supra note 37, at 381-82; Siddiqui, supra note 37, at 
528. 
 360. See Fletcher, supra note 37, at 129; Siddiqui, supra note 37, at 527-28. 
 361. See supra note 360. 
 362. See, e.g., Cianciarulo & David, supra note 37, at 380-81 (discussing how the 
BIA’s recognition of a social group based on FGM in Kasinga created similar flood-
gate fears which never materialized and explaining how asylees have other obstacles 
to surpass after establishing membership in a social group); Fletcher, supra note 37, 
at 129 (explaining the favorable experience of Canada); Siddiqui, supra note 37, at 
527-28 (explaining that the addition of gender as a basis for asylum had a negligible 
effect on asylum applications and describing the other elements that asylees need to 
prove). 
 363. See supra Part III.B. 
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CONCLUSION 
The resolution of the conflict between the circuit courts about the 
definition of PSG is an important goal that would help achieve con-
sistency and uniformity in the law.364  The Supreme Court should 
adopt the approach of the Third and Seventh Circuits because of the 
approach’s proper application of Chevron, relatively easy application, 
coherent statutory interpretation, rejection of social visibility and par-
ticularity, and consistency with the United States’ international obli-
gations.365 
Elizabeth, the brutally mistreated Cameroonian widow, was grant-
ed asylum in the United States more than eight years after her initial 
asylum application.366  Given that the IJ and BIA erred in their rul-
ings on Elizabeth’s PSG,367 the lack of clarity about the definition of 
PSG probably contributed to the duration of these proceedings.  
Hopefully, when this conflict is resolved, asylum applicants like Eliz-
abeth, will be able to find refuge in the United States through a time-
ly, consistent, and fair asylum process. 
 
 364. See supra notes 294-299 and accompanying text. 
 365. See supra Part III.B. 
 366. See supra notes 11, 13, 14 and accompanying text. 
 367. See supra notes 13, 17, 18 and accompanying text. 
